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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2023, Vol. 31 ›› Issue (9): 159-169.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1835

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A Study on the Entry Opportunity of Remanufacturers under the Competition of Original Product Producers and Compatible Product Producers

Hang DU1,2, Lai WEI1,3, Qing-hua ZHU1,3()   

  1. 1.Antai College of Economics & Management,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai 200030,China
    2.Institute of Ecology and Sustainable Development,Shanghai Academy of Social Sciences,Shanghai 200020,China
    3.Institute of Industry Research,Shanghai Jiao Tong University,Shanghai 200030,China
  • Received:2021-09-09 Revised:2022-01-12 Online:2023-09-15 Published:2023-09-19
  • Contact: Qing-hua ZHU E-mail:qhzhu@sjtu.edu.cn

Abstract:

With the rapid development of the urban economy, the amount of electronic waste has an explosive growth. Remanufacturing is a useful method that can bring effective disposal and resource utilization of electronic waste. There are three types of printing products in the domestic market: original, compatible, and remanufactured products. Considering the three different competition patterns already exist (original products monopoly, compatible products monopoly, and the simultaneous existence of both products) in the market before the remanufacturer’s entry, a “two-stage” static game analysis is established. First, a price game model is established for original and compatible products, and cost thresholds are identified for three different competition patterns. Furthermore, the entry opportunities of a remanufacturer are analyzed for three patterns, separately. The key results are: (1) the original products monopoly when the cost of compatible products exceeds a certain threshold, and only when consumers have high green utility, and a remanufacturer can enter the market by ensuring the quality of remanufacturing (strictly controlling the failure rate); (2) the original and compatible products duopoly when the cost of compatible products meets a certain threshold, and a remanufacturer can adopt a low-cost strategy to compete with an original product producer or a high-quality strategy to compete with a compatible product producer; (3) the compatible products monopoly when the cost of compatible products is lower than a certain threshold, and the remanufacturer can enter the market with a certain consumers’ green utility if the compatible quality is good or a remanufacturer enters the market by its quality advantages if the compatible quality is medium. Finally, a numerical example is explored based on the data from Jingdong.com to verify the correctness of the research. The results provide decision supports for a remanufacturer, giving practical implications for the remanufacturer’s entry strategies under different competitive patterns.

Key words: remanufacturing, compatible products, green utility, entry opportunities

CLC Number: