河流洪水风险控制的合作博弈分析

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.0105

Abstract

Abstract:

With the development of social economy and the influence of climate warming and other factors， river flood risk control is still facing many challenges. How to incentivize the agents on a river basin to voluntarily change their land use for soil and water retention？ The distribution of benefits among the agents is one of the most critical issues. This is one of the important topic on flood risk prevention， In view of the total benefit among agents on a river basin， an allocation rule based on Shapley value is proposed， which can establish a fair compensation mechanism among the upstream and downstream so as to incentivize the cooperation. The upstream agents should focus on the role played by forests as natural water retention features and enhance upstream water retention in order to attain the goal of flood risk prevention.

Key words: cooperative game, flood risk, Shapley value, compensations, digraph

CLC Number:

F224.32

Er-fang SHAN. The Cooperative Game Approach for River Flooding Risk[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2023, 31(9): 45-51.

Figures/Tables 5

$S$	{1}	{2}	{3}	{4}	{1,2}	{1,3}	{1,4}	{2,3}	{2,4}
$v (S)$	2	2	5	6	4	7	8	8	11
$Δ v (S)$	2	2	5	6	0	0	0	1	0
$F$	-	{2}	-	-	{2}	-	-	{2}	{2}
$S$	{3,4}	{1,2,3}	{1,2,4}	{1,3,4}	{2,3,4}	N
$v (S)$	11	10	10	13	14	16
$Δ v (S)$	0	0	0	0	0	0
$F$	-	{1,2}	{2}	{1}	{2}	{1,2}

$S$	{1}	{2}	{3}	{4}	{1,2}	{1,3}	{1,4}	{2,3}	{2,4}
$v (S)$	2	2	5	6	4	7	10	8	10
$Δ v (S)$	2	2	5	6	0	0	2	1	2
$F$	-	{2}	-	-	{2}	{1}	{1}	{2}	{2}
$S$	{3,4}	{1,2,3}	{1,2,4}	{1,3,4}	{2,3,4}	N
$v (S)$	11	10	14	16	16	21
$Δ v (S)$	0	0	0	1	0	0
$F$	-	{1,2}	{1,2}	{1}	{2}	{1,2}

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参与者1采用F,参与者2采用F			参与者1采用F, 参与者2采用-F
	参与者4 采用F	参与者4 采用-F	参与者4 采用F	参与者4 采用-F
参与者3采用F	(1,2,5,9)	(1,2,5,12)	(1,2,4,7)	(1,2,4,10)
参与者3采用-F	(1,2,7,8)	(1,2,7,11)	(1,2,6,6)	(1,2,6,9)
参与者1采用-F,参与者2采用F			参与者1采用-F,参与者2采用-F
	参与者4采用F	参与者4采用-F	参与者4采用F	参与者4采用-F
参与者3采用F	(2,2,4,6)	(2,2,4,9)	(2,2,3,4)	(2,2,3,7)
参与者3采用-F	(2,2,6,5)	(2,2,6,8)	(2,2,5,3)	(2,2,5,6)

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The Cooperative Game Approach for River Flooding Risk

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