碳交易机制引导下可再生能源发电企业创新策略研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.1914

Abstract

Abstract:

Technological innovation is crucial for the renewable power generation enterprises as it can help the enterprises to gain additional profits and reduce their costs. However， the cost of technological innovation is huge. Therefore， the Chinese government tend to provide subsidy to facilitate the innovation process related to renewable technology. As a result， the Chinese government and renewable power generation enterprises are two players with regards to technological innovation and incentive policy. The establishment of trading market of carbon emission changes the game as renewable enterprises can obtain additional profits by involving in Chinese Certified Emission Reduction （CCER） market. Therefore， it is necessary to investigate the new game between renewable power generation enterprises and the Chinese government under the background of carbon trading mechanism. The evolutionary game related to the innovation behavior of renewable energy enterprises and incentive issues of the government is studied. By considering the success probability of research and development （R&D）， R&D cycle time and other factors， the discounted costs and benefits related to the innovation behavior are obtained. Then， the payoff matrix based on these parameters are established. The evolutionary stable strategy of both the static incentive and punishment scenario and the dynamic incentive and punishment scenario are obtained. Moreover， the impact of the continuous R&D cost， success probability， additional purchase cost and other parameters is analyzed in the dynamic incentive and punishment scenario. The results indicate that： There exists a unique evolutionary stable strategy for both parties in the dynamic incentive and punishment scenario. The development of emission trading market is beneficial for the technological innovation as it utilized the power of invisible hand provided by emission trading market. The marketization of power prices can also improve the technological levels in renewable energy industry. The government can also stimulate the process of technological innovation by reducing its expenditure on providing supporting schemes. The results are useful for both the government and the renewable power generation enterprises.

Key words: innovation strategy, carbon reduction, renewable energy, evolutionary game, simulation analysis

CLC Number:

F205

Cheng Cheng,Runfei An,Kangyin Dong,Xiaohang Ren,Zhen Wang,Guohao Zhao. Research on Innovation Strategy for Renewable Power Generation Enterprises under the Background of Carbon Trading Mechanism——from the Perspective of Evolutionary Game[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2024, 32(3): 82-94.

Figures/Tables 12

变量	含义
$C$	政府选择激励策略时需承担的成本
$L$	政府给予可再生能源发电企业的创新补贴
$R$	可再生能源发电企业积极创新时给政府带来的收益
$F$	政府激励前提下向未创新的可再生能源发电企业征收的罚款
$C 1$	可再生能源发电企业的发电成本
$C 2$	可再生能源发电企业研发支出现值
$C 3$	可再生能源发电企业每年固定研发投入
$h$	可再生能源发电企业研发失败后用于购买新技术的支出
$R 1 R 3$	可再生能源发电企业（不）积极创新时减排收益的现值
$R 2 R 4$	可再生能源发电企业（不）积极创新时发电收益的现值
$z$	可再生能源发电企业技术研发成功的概率
$Q c$	企业初始碳交易量
$P c$	CCER配额价格
$Q d$	企业初始发电量
$P d$	售电价格
$μ$	企业发电量增长率

博弈

双方

可再生能源发电企业

积极创新

不创新

政府

激励

R - C - L

R 1 + R 2 + L - C 1 - C 2

F - C

R 3 + R 4 - F - C 1

不激励

R

R 1 + R 2 - C 1 - C 2

R 3 + R 4 - C 1

局部均衡点	$D e t J$	$T r J$	局部稳定性
（0,0）	α(F-C)	F-C+α	不定
（0,1）	α(L+C)	-L-C-α	不定
（1,0）	-(F-C)(L+F+α)	C+L+α	不定
（1,1）	(L+C)(-L-F-α)	C-F-α	不定
$x 0, y 0$	-y(1-y)(L+F)x(1-x)(-L-F)	0	稳定点

双方策略	净收益
政府激励，企业选择创新	$α$ +L+F
政府不激励，企业选择创新策略	$α$
企业创新，政府选择激励策略	-L-C
企业不创新，政府选择激励策略	F-C

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Research on Innovation Strategy for Renewable Power Generation Enterprises under the Background of Carbon Trading Mechanism——from the Perspective of Evolutionary Game

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