公平偏好对碳捕捉与封存项目产业化发展的影响分析

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.0368

Abstract

Abstract:

As the problem of global climate change， the industrial development of CO₂ Capture and Storage （CCS） projects attracts extensive attention from governments around the world. The fairness preference makes participants who make decisions pay more attention to the fairness of benefit distribution in cooperation than to their own absolute benefits. In the industrialization operation model of CCS， energy enterprises are in the core position， and their fairness preference will directly affect the success of the model. It aims at the fairness preference and the capital constraint of energy enterprises in the process of CCS industrial operation in this paper. An evolutionary game model between energy enterprises， CCS operators and banks is constructed. The different fairness preference types on the strategic interaction among the three parties and its sensitivity analysis are presented. Taking Guohua Shenmu Oxygen Enriched Combustion Transformation Project as an example， a simulation analysis is provided. Simulation results are shown as follows. （1） In the absence of fair preference or competitive preference， it is difficult for CCS to effectively promote the industrialization operation， and the competitive preference of participants is even worse for the long-term operation of CCS industrialization projects. （2） In the case of social welfare preference， the higher the preference coefficient， the more conducive to promote the industrialization of CCS project into the Pareto state. （3） The improvement of the participation willingness of banks and CCS operators have a positive impact on the industrial operation of CCS， among which the former has a more significant effect， and the effect is further amplified under the influence of social welfare preference. （4）The high operating cost of CCS technology cooperation among energy enterprises has a negative impact on the industrial development of CCS projects， but the social welfare preference can improve the willingness of energy enterprises to bear the investment cost， so as to reduce this negative impact. Hence， in order to promote the sustainable development project of CCS industrialization， it is very necessary to guide the fair preference of participants， stimulate the enthusiasm of financial institutions to participate， and reduce the operating cost of CCS.

Key words: CCS industrialization operation, fairness preference theory, capital constraint, evolutionary game theory

CLC Number:

X324

Lili Ding,Zhimeng Guo,Yu Bai,Ping Wang. Impact Analysis of Fairness Preference on Industrial Development of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) Projects[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2024, 32(4): 187-197.

Figures/Tables 12

类型	参数范围	解释
不存在公平性偏好	$α = 0$	企业仅关注自身得益的情况
竞争性偏好	$- 1 < α < 0$	企业关注相对得益，若利益分配少于他人，那么其效用就会下降
社会福利偏好	$0 < α < 1$	企业具有一定的利他倾向，即使所获得的利益少于他人，其效用值仍给予正的权重

主体	符号	含义
能源企业	$R$	不采用CCS技术时的生产经营收益
	$S p$	开展CCS技术合作时获得的政府补贴
	$C p 1$	开展CCS技术合作时的运营成本
	$C p 2$	不开展CCS技术合作时的运营成本
	$α$	公平偏好系数
	$f$	单位碳排税率
	$G$	碳排放量
	$λ$	能源企业分得的CO₂销售收益比率
	$v$	能源企业开展合作的前期沉没成本
CCS运营商	$Δ R 1$	积极合作时双方获得的CO₂销售总收益
	$Δ R 2$	消极合作时双方获得的CO₂销售总收益
	$S q$	政府补贴
	$C q 1$	积极合作时的运营成本
	$C q 2$	消极合作时的运营成本
银行	$S b$	提供绿色信贷后获得的政府补贴
	$M$	贷款总额
	$C b$	绿色信贷业务成本
	$i$	绿色信贷利率
	$r$	绿色信贷业务违约率

博弈参与者				CCS运营商
博弈参与者				积极合作	消极合作
能源企业	开展CCS技术合作	银行	提供绿色信贷业务	$?????????? R + λ Δ R 1 - C p 1 - i M + S p - α [(2 λ - 1) Δ R 1 - C p 1 - i M + S p + C q 1 - S q]$	$?????????? R + λ Δ R 2 - C p 1 - i M + S p - α [(2 λ - 1) Δ R 2 - C p 1 - i M + S p + C q 2 - S q]$
				$(1 - λ) Δ R 1 - C q 1 + S q$	$(1 - λ) Δ R 2 - C q 2 + S q$
				$(1 - r) i M - C b + S b$	$(1 - r) i M - C b + S b$
			不提供绿色信贷业务	$R - C p 2 - f G - v$	$R - C p 2 - f G - v$
				$0$	$0$
				$0$	$0$
	不开展CCS技术合作	银行	提供绿色信贷业务	$R - C p 2 - f G$	$R - C p 2 - f G$
				$0$	$0$
				$- C b$	$- C b$
			不提供绿色信贷业务	$R - C p 2 - f G$	$R - C p 2 - f G$
				$0$	$0$
				$0$	$0$

均衡点	特征值			符号	稳定性
均衡点	$λ 1$	$λ 2$	$λ 3$	符号	稳定性
$(0,0, 0)$	$- v$	$0$	$- C b$	-,N,-	鞍点
$(1,0, 0)$	$v$	$0$	$(1 - r) i M + S b - C b$	+,N,N	不稳定点
$(0,1, 0)$	$- v$	$0$	$- C b$	-,N,-	鞍点
$(0,0, 1)$	$λ Δ R 2 - C p 1 - i M + S p + C p 2 + f G$	$0$	$C b$	-,N,+	不稳定点
$(1,1, 0)$	$v$	$0$	$(1 - r) i M + S b - C b$	+,N,N	不稳定点
$(1,0, 1)$	$- [λ Δ R 2 - C p 1 - i M + S p + C p 2 + f G]$	$(1 - λ) (Δ R 1 - Δ R 2) - (C q 1 - C q 2)$	$- [(1 - r) i M + S b - C b]$	+,N,N	不稳定点
$(0,1, 1)$	$λ Δ R 1 - C p 1 - i M + S p + C p 2 + f G$	$0$	$C b$	-,N,+	不稳定点
$(1,1, 1)$	$- [λ Δ R 1 - C p 1 - i M + S p + C p 2 + f G]$	$- [(1 - λ) (Δ R 1 - Δ R 2) - (C q 1 - C q 2)]$	$- [(1 - r) i M + S b - C b]$	+,N,N	不稳定点

均衡点	特征值			符号	稳定性
均衡点	$λ 1$	$λ 2$	$λ 3$	符号	稳定性
$(0,0, 0)$	$- v$	$0$	$- C b$	-,N,-	鞍点
$(1,0, 0)$	$v$	$0$	$(1 - r) i M + S b - C b$	+,N,N	不稳定点
$(0,1, 0)$	$- v$	$0$	$- C b$	-,N,-	鞍点
$(0,0, 1)$	$λ Δ R 2 - C p 1 - i M + S p + C p 2 + f G - α [(2 λ - 1) Δ R 2 - C P 1 - i M + S p + C q 2 - S q]$	$0$	$C b$	-,N,+	不稳定点
$(1,1, 0)$	$v$	$0$	$(1 - r) i M + S b - C b$	+,N,N	不稳定点
$(1,0, 1)$	$- {λ Δ R 2 - C p 1 - i M + S p + C p 2 + f G - α [(2 λ - 1) Δ R 2 - C P 1 - i M + S p + C q 2 - S q]}$	$(1 - λ) (Δ R 1 - Δ R 2) - (C q 1 - C q 2)$	$- [(1 - r) i M + S b - C b]$	+,N,N	不稳定点
$(0,1, 1)$	$? λ Δ R 1 - C p 1 - i M + S p + C p 2 + f G - α [(2 λ - 1) Δ R 1 - C P 1 - i M + S p + C q 1 - S q]$	$0$	$C b$	-,N,+	不稳定点
$(1,1, 1)$	$- {λ Δ R 1 - C p 1 - i M + S p + C p 2 + f G - α [(2 λ - 1) Δ R 1 - C P 1 - i M + S p + C q 1 - S q]}$	$- [(1 - λ) (Δ R 1 - Δ R 2) - (C q 1 - C q 2)]$	$- [(1 - r) i M + S b - C b]$	+,N,N	不稳定点

均衡点	特征值			符号	稳定性
均衡点	$λ 1$	$λ 2$	$λ 3$	符号	稳定性
$(0,0, 0)$	$- v$	$0$	$- C b$	-,N,-	鞍点
$(1,0, 0)$	$v$	$0$	$(1 - r) i M + S b - C b$	+,N,N	不稳定点
$(0,1, 0)$	$- v$	$0$	$- C b$	-,N,-	鞍点
$(0,0, 1)$	$λ Δ R 2 - C p 1 - i M + S p + C p 2 + f G - α [(2 λ - 1) Δ R 2 - C P 1 - i M + S p + C q 2 - S q]$	$0$	$C b$	N,N,+	不稳定点
$(1,1, 0)$	$v$	$0$	$(1 - r) i M + S b - C b$	+,N,N	不稳定点
$(1,0, 1)$	$- {λ Δ R 2 - C p 1 - i M + S p + C p 2 + f G - α [(2 λ - 1) Δ R 2 - C P 1 - i M + S p + C q 2 - S q]}$	$(1 - λ) (Δ R 1 - Δ R 2) - (C q 1 - C q 2)$	$- [(1 - r) i M + S b - C b]$	N,N,N	不确定
$(0,1, 1)$	$? λ Δ R 1 - C p 1 - i M + S p + C p 2 + f G - α [(2 λ - 1) Δ R 1 - C P 1 - i M + S p + C q 1 - S q]$	$0$	$C b$	N,N,+	不稳定点
$(1,1, 1)$	$- {λ Δ R 1 - C p 1 - i M + S p + C p 2 + f G - α [(2 λ - 1) Δ R 1 - C P 1 - i M + S p + C q 1 - S q]}$	$- [(1 - λ) (Δ R 1 - Δ R 2) - (C q 1 - C q 2)]$	$- [(1 - r) i M + S b - C b]$	N,N,N	不确定

$Δ R 1$	$Δ R 2$	$λ$	$R$	$C P 1$	$C P 2$	$S p$	$f$	$G$	$S q$	$C q 1$	$C q 2$	$C b$	$S b$	$M$	$i$	$r$	$v$
28	20	0.4	250	16	8	3	0.2	100	3	10	8	5	5	25	0.2	0.2	5

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Impact Analysis of Fairness Preference on Industrial Development of Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) Projects

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