Abstract:

Public information release and response to public concerns are key links in the prevention and control of major infectious diseases.The release of epidemic information requires the coordination and cooperation of government departments， medical experts， and the public. Promoting the linkage between government departments and medical experts in the early stages of the epidemic to quickly obtain and share real-time information plays an important role in curbing the spread of the epidemic. However， due to the differences in national conditions and social environment there are great differences in epidemic information release systems in various countries. Government departments and medical experts should timely adjust various epidemic prevention and control strategies， including information release， according to the development trend of the epidemic situation.According to the different subjects and channels of epidemic information release， four epidemic information release modes are summarized in the environment of highly uncertain information in the early stage of epidemic， namely linkage mode， government monopoly mode， expert disclosure mode and delay mode. Then the evolutionary game model of multi-channel information release of government departments and medical experts is constructed.Firstly， the Nash equilibrium was solved by a one-time simultaneous game to analyze the optimal effort level and the optimal income of both parties under each information release mode in the short term. Then， both sides continuously adjusted their information release strategies in a long period of time and analyzed the evolution path and equilibrium conditions of each epidemic information release mode.Finally， the influence of correlation coefficient on the evolution of information release mode is analyzed through a case.The results show that the trade-off between the short-term benefits of social stability maintenance and the long-term benefits of epidemic prevention and control is the key factor affecting evolution.There are multiple evolutionary paths in the information release mode. Increasing the long-term benefits of epidemic prevention and control is conducive to the linkage mode becoming an evolutionary equilibrium.In addition， the information release model also has multiple evolution paths such as “government monopoly” and “expert disclosure”， and it is necessary to avoid the multiple equilibrium of “government monopoly” and “expert disclosure” or the reciprocating fluctuation caused by information release disorder.As the leading force in the fight against epidemic diseases， government departments have taken a series of measures to promote the formation of a joint force between government departments and medical experts in the fight against epidemic diseases by improving the construction of epidemic information release system， reducing the cost of fighting epidemic diseases， changing the working mode of “tightening inside and loosening outside”， giving professionals a higher tolerance， and strengthening the monitoring and prediction of epidemic information， so as to improve the authority， accuracy and efficiency of epidemic information release.In case selection， the epidemic response measures and relevant data of China and the United States are selected to study the impact of cost coefficient and synergistic benefit coefficient on the evolution of information release mode.Four information release modes are summarized in the context of high information uncertainty at the early stage of the epidemic， then the optimal decision-making and the long-term evolution path of different information release modes combining the short-term benefits of social stability maintenance and long-term benefits of epidemic prevention and control are analyzed. Relevant research has certain theoretical reference significance for further improving the information release of major emergencies.

Key words: epidemic situation of infectious diseases, evolutionary game, emergency management, information release mode, public health emergency