碳交易驱动下的政企碳减排演化博弈分析

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1401

Abstract

Abstract:

Carbon trading， as one of the most efficient market means in emission reduction policy， has a profound impact on enterprise carbon-reduction. Based on system dynamic theory， within the constraints of public willingness， an evolutionary game model of government and enterprise carbon-reduction is constructed under the driven of carbon trading. Taking Hubei Province as an example， through the visual analysis of government and enterprise behavior， possible game situations between government and enterprises in the development of carbon trading are discussed， and the corresponding strategies are given. The results show that there are several different game results in the development of carbon market. For the game equilibrium of （action， carbon-reduction）， it is necessary to encourage enterprises to take emission reduction measures and prolong the "window period" of carbon reduction. Adopting the strategies of dynamic punishment and dynamic subsidy can eliminate the periodic behavior pattern in the game between government and enterprises. By reducing carbon emission and regulating carbon price， the strategy combination can be changed from （inaction， no reduction） to （action， carbon-reduction）. The proportion of the latter combination should be increased. The initial willingness is very important in the game between government and enterprises. The higher initial willingness is more conducive to achieve （action， carbon-reduction） strategy combination. The conclusions have strong implications for enterprise carbon reduction strategies and government action in the process of carbon trading， and provide a reference for the development of carbon market.

Key words: carbon trading, carbon reduction, evolutionary game, stable strategy

CLC Number:

F062.1

Guochang Fang,Yu He,Lixin Tian. Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government and Enterprises Carbon-reduction under the Driven of Carbon Trading[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2024, 32(5): 196-206.

Figures/Tables 13

参数	定义
$U 1 (U 2)$	企业减排(不减排)时政府的收益 $(U 1 > U 2)$
$R 1 (R 2)$	企业减排(不减排)时的综合收益( $R 1 > R 2$ )
$C 1$	企业的减排成本
$C 2$	政府的监管成本
$S$	政府给予企业的减排补贴
$F$	企业不减排政府收取的罚金
$θ$	交易额分配系数
$D 1$	企业意愿对政府的约束
$D 2$	民众意愿对企业的约束
$D 3$	民众意愿对政府的约束
$p$	碳交易价格
$T$	免费分配的碳配额 $(T > T 1, T < T 2)$
$T 1 (T 2)$	企业减排(不减排)时的碳排放量 $(T 1 < T 2)$
$x P 1$	碳配额的出售收入
$(1 - x) P 2$	碳配额的买入成本

博弈

双方

企业

减排

不减排

地方政府

作为

U 1 - C 2 - S + θ P 1

R 1 - C 1 + S + P 1

U 2 - C 2 + F + θ P 2

R 2 - F - D 2 - P 2

不作为

U 1 - D 1

R 1 - C 1

U 2 - D 3

R 2 - D 2

均衡点	$D e t (J) ??$
$(0,0)$	$(F - C 2 + D 3 + θ P 2) · (R 1 - C 1 - R 2 + D 2)$
$(0,1)$	( $(D 1 - C 2 - S + θ P 1) · (- R 1 + C 1 + R 2 - D 2)$
$(1,0)$	$(- F + C 2 - D 3 - θ P 2) · (R 1 - C 1 + S + P 1 - R 2 + D 2 + P 2 + F)$
$(1,1)$	$(- R 1 + C 1 - S - P 1 + R 2 - D 2 - P 2 - F) · (- D 1 + C 2 + S - θ P 1)$
$(x 0, y 0)$	$X * Y$

References 25

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Evolutionary Game Analysis of Government and Enterprises Carbon-reduction under the Driven of Carbon Trading

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