考虑集中式惩罚和参照依赖的企业环保投资行为与合作演化

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.0816

Abstract

Abstract:

As important participants of society， enterprises should take responsibility of investing in the public environment production. However， the enterprises may be non-cooperative during the investment due to the public attributes of environmental resources and the externality characteristics of environmental investment， which may lead to the undercapitalization， and thus the cooperation would get to the collective action dilemma.Based on the perspective of combining centralized punishment and reference dependence， an evolutionary game model of enterprise environmental investment cooperation is constructed， and different application scenarios of cooperation invest are simulated that with/without the influence factors of reference dependence strategy interaction rules， centralized punishment mechanism， different penalties， etc. Then， by the statistical testing methods， the impact of centralized punishment and enterprise reference dependence strategy interaction on enterprise environmental investment cooperation is analyzed under different penalties.It is found that　（1） With appropriate penalties， the centralized punishment mechanism can improve the level of enterprise environmental investment cooperation；（2） Under different penalties， there is a significant difference in the benefits of collective action in enterprise environmental investment cooperation. Under certain conditions， there is an optimal threshold for the penalty of enterprises， which can maximize the benefits of collective action；（3） When considering the incentive factors of punishment only， it is not enough to maintain enterprise environmental investment cooperation. More importantly， the formation of a benign strategic interaction based on reference dependence between enterprises can fully stimulate enterprises to actively participate in environmental investment cooperation actions. The above conclusions provide new ideas for improving the ecological environment.

Key words: enterpriseenvironmental investment, collective action, centralized punishment, reference dependence

CLC Number:

F270

Yuling Liao,Siyin Lei,Meizhe Song,Lining Zeng,Wenkang Deng,Daofu Hu. Corporate Environmental Investment Behavior and Cooperation Evolution Considering Centralized Sanction and Reference Dependence[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2024, 32(5): 307-314.

Figures/Tables 8

$α$	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7	0.8
平均数	2226.36	3247.93	3050.28	2456.34	1876.47	1298.53	882.49	559.23
中位数	2209.31	3200.96	3046.93	2424.03	1865.07	1276.42	870.27	550.68

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惩罚系数	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7
0.2	-30.278
0.2	(.000)
0.3	-26.544	6.175
0.3	(.000)	(.000)
0.4	-8.059	26.750	22.436
0.4	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
0.5	13.225	49.708	48.476	27.730
0.5	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
0.6	36.871	73.927	76.849	60.146	36.114
0.6	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
0.7	55.441	92.866	99.580	87.318	68.523	34.710
0.7	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
0.8	70.358	107.746	117.716	109.753	97.024	68.181	38.126
0.8	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)

检验方法	检验结果
检验方法	统计量	P值
Kruskal-Wallis H检验	6438.401	.000
中位数检验	5271.000	.000
Jonkheere-Terpstra检验	-81.634	.000

惩罚系数	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.7
0.2	-1884.248
0.2	(.000)
0.3	-1658.863	225.385
0.3	(.000)	(.815)
0.4	-565.002	1319.246	1093.861
0.4	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
0.5	748.107	2632.355	2406.970	1313.109
0.5	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
0.6	2123.733	4007.981	3782.596	2688.735	1375.626
0.6	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
0.7	3195.344	5079.592	4854.207	3760.346	2447.237	1071.611
0.7	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)
0.8	4132.753	6017.001	5791.616	4697.755	3384.646	2009.020	937.409
0.8	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)	(.000)

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Corporate Environmental Investment Behavior and Cooperation Evolution Considering Centralized Sanction and Reference Dependence

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