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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2024, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (6): 163-172.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1572

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Equilibrium Analysis of Manufacturers' Digital Transformation Strategy under Supply Chain Competition

Hua Zhang1,3,Xin Gu2,3()   

  1. 1.Business School, Changzhou University, Changzhou 213164, China
    2.Business School, Sichuan University, Chengdu 610064, China
    3.Chengdu Soft Innovation Intelligence Association, Chengdu 610023, China
  • Received:2021-08-10 Revised:2021-11-29 Online:2024-06-25 Published:2024-07-03
  • Contact: Xin Gu E-mail:guxin@scu.edu.cn

Abstract:

The digital economy is profoundly changing the fundamental principles and value creation logic of the manufacturing industry and has become a new driving force leading economic growth. However, the digital economy also exerts great pressure on the traditional development model of the manufacturing industry. Some firms implementing digital transformation may not only use their market power to occupy excess monopoly profits but also curb the living space of traditional manufacturers by technological advantages. Therefore, choosing an appropriate opportunity to implement digital transformation is an important decision issue faced by manufacturers.Two competitive supply chains consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer are consided, and dynamic game models are employed to analyze the optimal strategy and game equilibrium of manufacturers' digital transformation. The results show that either of the two manufacturers can maximize its own profits, downstream retailer profits, and supply chain market share by implementing digital transformation ahead of its competitors. It is also found that manufacturers' digital transformation will generate technological shocks and technological spillovers on the competitor who adopt traditional technologies, and the effect of technological shocks is greater than technological spillovers, which not only reduces the competitor's profits but also grabs its supply chain's market share. Regarding the strategic decision of digital transformation, whether the two manufacturers make decisions in sequence or at the same time, both of them implementing digital transformation will have a win-win effect, increasing manufacturers' profits and forming a Nash equilibrium of supply chain competition.Two key contributions are made to the literature. On the one hand, different from the previous research on digital transformation, not only the technological spillovers of digital transformation to incumbent firms are considered but also the impact of technological shocks about digital transformation on market competition is examined. The strategic decision of manufacturers' digital transformation is analyzed from the perspective of supply chain competition and theoretical support is provided for a deeper understanding of the mechanism of digital transformation on market competition. On the other hand, the literature in the field of supply chain competition and dynamic games mainly focuses on the game among firms in the traditional economic context, and seldom pays attention to the new business phenomena in the digital economy. The dynamic game models are used to analyze the Nash equilibrium of manufacturers' digital transformation in supply chain competition, the conditions for achieving a win-win effect between manufacturers are investigated, and the strategic decision for manufacturers is discussed to maximize profits under different strategy profiles, thereby enriching the literature in the field of supply chain competition and dynamic game.

Key words: digital transformation, supply chain competition, technological spillover, dynamic game

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