Abstract:

In the context of tight environmental regulations， companies have frequent strategic innovations. The purpose of this paper is to drive the spontaneous innovation of enterprises and explore the rational boundaries of environmental regulatory policies. A three-party evolutionary game model is built for the government， the public and enterprises， and linear dynamic penalty schemes and nonlinear dynamic penalty-subsidy schemes are deigned on this basis. The Box-Behnken method is used to solve the optimal coefficient value of the quadratic subsidy function under the nonlinear dynamic scheme. With the aid of simulation tools and Lyapunov's theorem， the stability of the enterprise's ecological innovation behavior in three different stages is double verified. The results show that： （1） The willingness of enterprises to independently adopt ecological innovation under the static scheme is highly random and unstable. （2） The linear scheme can promote the stable but non-optimal state of the system. （3） Under the nonlinear dynamic penalty-subsidy scheme， the system can reach an optimal stable state， and ecological innovation becomes a long-term strategy. The conclusions can provide a reference for the design of nonlinear dynamic incentive policy research.

Key words: ecological innovation, environmental regulation, evolutionary game, box-behnken