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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2024, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (6): 290-300.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.2048

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How should Charging Infrastructure Subsidies Assess the Situation? Analysis Based on Multi-party Dynamic Game

Shuai Ling1,2,Jiyuan Guo1,Yue Li1,Shoufeng Ma1,2()   

  1. 1.College of Management and Economics, Tianjin University, Tianjin, 300072, China
    2.Laboratory of Computation and Analytics of Complex Management Systems (CACMS), Tianjin University, Tianjin, 300072
  • Received:2022-09-15 Revised:2022-12-22 Online:2024-06-25 Published:2024-07-03
  • Contact: Shoufeng Ma E-mail:sfma@tju.edu.cn

Abstract:

To encourage the development of charging infrastructure, the government has created a series of macro-level incentive programs. On this premise, the charging infrastructure subsidy policies of a number of provinces and municipalities around the nation have been adopted successively, albeit with vastly diverse methods and results. To investigate the incentive effects of different subsidy approaches and the window conditions for policy adjustment, a multi-party dynamic game model with the goal of maximizing the government 's subsidy performance is developed, based on both the number of piles constructed and the operation level of charging infrastructure, and analytical analysis and arithmetic analysis of different subsidy approaches are conducted. It is determined that the government's subsidy plan should reject the one-size-fits-all reward and subsidy standards and need consider the growth of the electric vehicle sector, the operational capability and profitability of charging infrastructure building and operation businesses. Specifically, when the green effect of EVs is insufficient and the operational capacity of charging infrastructure construction and operation enterprises is weak, it is appropriate to adopt construction subsidies; when the green effect of EVs is high and the operational capacity of charging infrastructure construction and operation enterprises is strong, adopting operational subsidies can achieve better subsidy performance. Finally, it is suggested that, in the early stages of charging infrastructure enterprise development, the government should provide subsidies to alleviate pressure on enterprises and promote enterprise investment. As the charging infrastructure industry matures, the government can gradually eliminate subsidies or even taxes if the enterprise's profitability is high enough and the proportion of electric vehicles charging in public charging infrastructure is high enough. This study offers the government with references for adjusting the subsidy system in a timely and effective manner, enhancing the subsidy's efficiency, and promoting electric vehicles more effectively.

Key words: charging infrastructure, subsidy strategy, dynamic game, construction subsidy, operation subsidy

CLC Number: