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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2024, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (7): 258-269.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1474

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Research on Government Subsidy Model of Dual-sales Channel Closed-loop Supply Chain

Wenbin Wang(),Ye Liu,Shiyuan Quan,Luosheng Zhong,Jia Lv   

  1. School of Economics and Management,China University of Mining and Technology,Xuzhou 221116,China
  • Received:2021-07-27 Revised:2021-11-14 Online:2024-07-25 Published:2024-08-07
  • Contact: Wenbin Wang E-mail:wangwenbin818@126.com

Abstract:

In today’s society, a large number of waste electrical and electronic products increase dramatically. If these waste products cannot be effectively recycled, it will not only bring greater harm to the environment, but also make the production cost of the enterprise high. The Chinese government implements a subsidy policy to encourage the development of the recycling industry. Although the government subsidy policy has a positive effect on the recycling of waste electronic products by enterprises, the government is facing the problem that the subsidy amount cannot make ends meet. How to choose the subsidy object to achieve the optimal benefit of the limited subsidy amount is urgently needed to study.Therefore, a closed-loop supply chain game model with different government subsidies is constructed under dual sales channels composed of a manufacturer, a retailer, and a recycler, and the government’s choice of different subsidy objects on supply chain members’ decisions, supply chain members’ profits, consumption surplus and the impact of social welfare is analyzed. The correctness of the conclusions is verified through data simulation on the basis of reference to relevant literature and enterprise research.Research shows:(i) the best government subsidy pattern is that simultaneously subsidize manufacturers and collectors, allocate approximately equal subsidies to both manufacturers and collectors, and appropriately implement as many subsidies as possible for unit product when consumer surplus and social welfare are optimal; (ii) there is a unique subsidy ratio that maximizes consumer surplus, manufacturers and retailers profit, and product prices when unit product subsidy is fixed. Moreover, the profit of collectors and the collection rate are higher than the situation where the government subsidizes manufacturers separately and without government subsidies under this ratio; (iii) when the market size is greater than the threshold, the government subsidizing manufacturers and collectors at any ratio can reduce the direct sales price, the wholesale price and retail price, and increase the collection rate; (iv) improving the intensity of competition between dual sales channels and expanding the remanufacturing cost advantageare both beneficial to increase the collection rate.Some management suggestions are provided for the government, manufacturing companies and waste product recycling companies. For the government, it is necessary to comprehensively consider the market scale and recycling scale of the product when choosing subsidies. For manufacturers, it is possible to reduce the cost of product remanufacturing through technological innovation or improved management. For recyclers, they can reduce recycling costs, increase the recycling rate of waste products, and increase recycling profits through technological innovation and narrowing the scope of business operations.

Key words: dual-sales-channel closed-loop supply chain, government subsidies, consumer surplus, social welfare

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