基于服务竞争的远视零售商联合采购联盟的竞合博弈策略分析

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.2591

Abstract

Abstract:

With the increasingly fierce market competition， in order to reduce procurement costs and obtain competitive advantages， small and medium-sized retailers form joint purchasing coalitions， cooperate with each other and collect demand， so that they have no obvious difference in product quality and price， but they still keep competitive in service， then they formed a co-opetition relationship of retailer joint procurement based on service competition.Three retailers based on service competition are considered to purchase products from a common manufacturer and then sell them to consumers. There are three joint purchasing coalitions for retailers， namely retailer purchase independently， two retailers purchase jointly and three retailers purchase jointly. It is assumed that the demand of retailer i is affected by its own service level and the service level of others retailers， the demand function of retailer i is： $q i (s) = α + β s i - β 3 ∑ j ≠ i s j$ ， i=1， 2， 3， where $α$ is the basic market demand of each retailer， $β$ is the sensitivity of market demand to the retailer’ s service level； the service cost of retailer $i$ is assumed to be $η s i 2 / 2$ .According to the above assumptions， firstly， the service level， market demand and profit of retailers under different coalition structures are compared， and the optimal strategy choice of retailer joint procurement coalition is obtained， and then the concept of largest consistent set in cooperative game theory are used to describe the stable structure of joint purchasing coalition of farsighted retailers. The results shows that，（1） if the service cost is low or high， retailers will provide the highest service level when they form the grand purchasing coalition， if the unit service cost is moderate， the external retailers will provide the higher service level when two retailers jointly purchase. （2） The order quantity of retailers in grand coalition is the highest when the unit service cost is low or moderate， if the unit service is high， the internal retailers in two-retailer purchasing coalition will get the highest purchase demand. （3） If the unit service cost is high enough， the profits of every retailer are the highest when they form the grand purchasing coalition， and the coalition will keep stable.The research results provide a decision-making basis for the choice of retailer service strategy and maintaining the stable structure of the coalition in the joint procurement coalition under the relationship of co-opetition.

Key words: service competition, purchasing coalition, farsighted retailers, co-opetition game

CLC Number:

O225

Dan Xiao,Xiaonan Ji,Yan Luo,Yongwu Zhou. Co-Opetition Game Analysis of Joint Purchasing Coalitions of Farsighted Retailers Based on Service Competition[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2024, 32(7): 270-280.

Figures/Tables 14

变量	说明或定义	备注
s_i	零售商i的服务水平	s=(s₁, s₂, s₃)
q_i	零售商i的市场需求
α	每个零售商的市场基本需求
β	市场需求对零售商服务水平的敏感程度
w	单位产品的最高批发价格
$w m i n$	单位产品的最低批发价格
d	折扣比例
η	零售商的单位服务成本
p	产品的零售价格
π_i^（^）	零售商i的利润	包括I，C，G

$(2 d β 2, 229 d β 2)$	$(229 d β 2, 83 d β 2)$	$(329 d β 2, 349 d β 2)$	$(349 d β 2, + ∞)$
$s i I, * < s i G, *$	$s i I, * < s i G, *$	$s i I, * < s i G, *$	$s i I, * < s i G, *$
$s 1 C, * < s 3 C, *$	$s 1 C, * < s 3 C, *$	$s 1 C, * > s 3 C, *$	$s 1 C, * > s 3 C, *$
$s 1 I, * > s 1 C, *$	$s 1 I, * > s 1 C, *$	$s 1 I, * < s 1 C, *$	$s 1 I, * < s 1 C, *$
$s 1 I, * < s 3 C, *$	$s 1 I, * < s 3 C, *$	$s 1 I, * > s 3 C, *$	$s 1 I, * > s 3 C, *$
$s 1 C, * < s 1 G, *$	$s 1 C, * < s 1 G, *$	$s 1 C, * > s 1 G, *$	$s 1 C, * < s 1 G, *$
$s 3 C, * < s 1 G, *$	$s 3 C, * > s 1 G, *$	$s 3 C, * < s 1 G, *$	$s 3 C, * < s 1 G, *$

$(2 d β 2, X)$	$(X, Y)$	$(Y, 83 d β 2)$	$η ∈ (Z, ∞)$
$q i I, * < q i G, *$	$q i I, * < q i G, *$	$q i I, * < q i G, *$	$q i I, * < q i G, *$
$q 1 C, * > q 3 C, *$	$q 1 C, * < q 3 C, *$	$q 1 C, * < q 3 C, *$	$q 1 C, * > q 3 C, *$
$q 1 I, * > q 1 C, *$	$q 1 I, * > q 1 C, *$	$q 1 I, * > q 1 C, *$	$q 1 I, * < q 1 C, *$
$q 1 I, * > q 3 C, *$	$q 1 I, * > q 3 C, *$	$q 1 I, * < q 3 C, *$	$q 1 I, * > q 3 C, *$
$q 1 C, * < q 1 G, *$	$q 1 C, * < q 1 G, *$	$q 1 C, * < q 1 G, *$	$q 1 C, * > q 1 G, *$
$q 3 C, * < q 1 G, *$	$q 3 C, * < q 1 G, *$	$q 3 C, * < q 1 G, *$	$q 3 C, * < q 1 G, *$

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Co-Opetition Game Analysis of Joint Purchasing Coalitions of Farsighted Retailers Based on Service Competition

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