考虑互补性需求和权力结构的网络营销服务链合作模式研究

doi:10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.2144

Abstract

Abstract:

With the development of the Internet， advertisers are spending more and more on online advertising； however the effect is not always satisfactory. In order to improve the effect of online advertising and expand market demand， an increasing number of advertising agencies （agency） have started providing marketing services directly for advertisers while selling online advertising media（media） advertising resources.There are two common modes of cooperation between media and agency： premium mode and rebate mode. Under the premium mode， the media offers the advertising resources to theagency at a pre-specified wholesale price， and the agency is free to set the sales price in the marketplace. Under the rebate mode， the price for the advertising resources is determined by the media instead of the agency.The complementary relationship between advertising resources and marketing services makes the choice of service chain cooperation mode more difficult. Because under the premium mode， the agency has the incentive to cut the price of advertising resources to promote the sales of marketing services in order to maximize her own profit. Meanwhile， channel power structure is also an important factor to consider when choosing the optimal cooperation mode. The channel leader has the priority of choosing a more beneficial cooperation mode.Therefore， when downstream agency provides complementary services at the same time， the mode of cooperation between media and agency under different power structures has become problematic for the online marketing service supply chain.In the paper， an online marketing service supply chain comprising of one media and oneagency is considered. The media distributes advertising resources through the agency. Besides advertising resources， the agency also sells marketing services. The advertising resources and marketing services are complementary， which means the demand of each good is influenced not only by its own price but also by the price of the other.Game-theoretic models are developed to study the corporate behavior under different power structures （media Stackelberg and agency Stackelberg） and different cooperation modes （premium mode and rebate mode）.Through comparing equilibrium decisions and profits in diverse scenarios， the optimal cooperation modes for the service supply chain are obtained. Then the influence of the rebaterate and the degree of complement is analyzed.Findings reveal that， the cooperation mode selection is influenced by power structure， rebate rate and complementary degree. Under media Stackelberg structure， it is optimal for the media to choose premium mode when the rebate rate is high or the rebate rate is low but complementary degree is high， otherwise it is better for her to select rebate mode. Under agency Stackelberg structure， the situation is almost the opposite. For the overall channel， however， it is shown that the performance is always better under the rebate mode than under the premium mode regardless of channel power. Under the premium mode， power structure only affects the wholesale price， but under rebate mode it affects the sale price of both advertising resources and marketing services. Under the rebate mode， with the increase of rebate rate， the price of advertising resources will increase while the price of marketing services will decrease. Furthermore， power structure has a significant effect on the profits of channel members；they always get higher profits when they play a dominant role under the same cooperation mode.Our research also has management implications for the service supply chain decision-making. One prominent finding is that the degree of complementarity can critically affect cooperation mode choice. So it is necessary for the media and the agency to consider when making pricing decision and choosing cooperation mode.Moreover，maintaining competitive advantage and taking the initiative in the game can also benefit the channel members. The media and the agency should adjust pricing decisions flexibly according to different power structures.

Key words: online marketing, complementarity, power structure, premium mode, rebate mode

CLC Number:

F272

Zehui Ge,Yunhuan Zhang,Daoping Wang,Xinyu Li. Cooperation Mode of Online Marketing Service Supply Chain Considering Complementarity and Channel Power[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2024, 32(9): 271-280.

Figures/Tables 10

参数	含义
$a$	潜在市场需求量
$β$	价格弹性系数
$k$	广告资源和营销服务的互补程度
$θ$	返点比例
$w$	广告资源批发价格
$m$	代理商的广告资源边际利润
$p 1$	广告资源销售价格
$p 2$	营销服务销售价格
$D 1$	广告资源的需求量
$D 2$	营销服务的需求量
$π m$	媒体的利润
$π a$	代理商的利润
$π t$	服务链的总利润

变量	溢价模式	返点模式（ $0 < k ≤ 3 - 1$ 或 $3 - 1 < k < 1 且 0 < θ < 4 - (k 2 + 2 k) k 2 + 2 k$ ）
$w *$	$a 2 β$	—
$p 1 M S *$	$a (k + 3) 4 β (k + 1)$	$a (2 - k) 2 β (2 - k 2 - k 2 θ)$
$p 2 M S *$	$a 2 β (k + 1)$	$a (4 - k 2 - k 2 θ - 2 k - 2 k θ) 4 β (2 - k 2 - k 2 θ)$
$π m M S *$	$a 2 8 β$	$a 2 (2 - k) 2 (1 - θ) 8 β (2 - k 2 - k 2 θ)$
$π a M S *$	$a 2 (5 - 3 k) 16 β (k + 1)$	$a 2 16 1 + θ - 16 k 1 + θ + k 4 1 + θ 2 + 4 k 3 1 + 4 θ + 3 θ 2 - 4 k 2 1 + 5 θ + 3 θ 2 16 β 2 - k 2 1 + θ 2$

变量	溢价模式	返点模式
$w *$	$a 4 β$	—
$p 1 A S *$	$a (k + 3) 4 β (k + 1)$	$a (4 - k 2 - 2 k) 2 β (4 - 2 k 2 - k 2 θ)$
$p 2 A S *$	$a 2 β (k + 1)$	$a (2 - k - k θ) β (4 - 2 k 2 - k 2 θ)$
$π m A S *$	$a 2 16 β$	$(1 - θ) a 2 (4 - k 2 - 2 k) 2 4 β (4 - 2 k 2 - k 2 θ) 2$
$π a A S *$	$a 2 (3 - k) 8 β (k + 1)$	$a 2 (4 + 4 θ - 4 k - 4 k θ + k 2) 4 β (4 - 2 k 2 - k 2 θ)$

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Cooperation Mode of Online Marketing Service Supply Chain Considering Complementarity and Channel Power

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