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Chinese Journal of Management Science ›› 2024, Vol. 32 ›› Issue (9): 313-322.doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.2079

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Scientific Research Assessment and Patent Examination Strategies of University Considering Differencesin Reward and Punishment

Qiang Chen1,Junmei Rong1,Xuhua Chang2(),Lei Gong1,3   

  1. 1.School of Economics and Management, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China
    2.Shanghai International College of Intellectual Property, Tongji University, Shanghai 200092, China
    3.School of Management Engineering, Shandong Jianzhu University, Jinan 250101, China
  • Received:2021-10-12 Revised:2022-02-23 Online:2024-09-25 Published:2024-10-12
  • Contact: Xuhua Chang E-mail:cumtcxh2008@126.com

Abstract:

High-quality scientific research is the cornerstone of socio-economic development and scientific and technological progress. However, universities attach great importance to the acquisition of projects and the publication of papers, high evaluation standards, and high competition, which have led to the phenomenon of teachers tending to short-term and low-quality scientific research. In the context of the urgent need to improve the quality of research, how to improve the institutional design of universities to encourage teachers to carry out in-depth and high-quality scientific research has become the research problem.Based on the process of teachers' scientific research, a two-stage scientific research quality model including the reward and punishment mechanism of faculties' performance appraisal and the patent examination mechanism has been constructed. The concept of faculty research quality effort level is added to the model; two performance appraisal mechanisms are considered. Guided by the improvement of scientific research quality, game theory and numerical simulation analysis are used to explore the optimal reward and punishment mechanism and patent examination mechanism, and the influence mechanism of faculties' scientific research quality effort level is analyzed.The data for the simulation analysis is based on a real research project case, and some data are assumed on this basis.The applicable conditions of different assessment, reward and punishment schemes are analyzed, and the countermeasures and suggestions for quality management of scientific research are put forward.These findings provide theoretical contributions for universities to improve faculties' research quality improvement mechanisms in terms of performance assessment and patent review.The main conclusions are as follows: 1)If the income of patent transformation obtained by teachers is enough to exceed the cost of patent transformation, the university will not need to carry out patent examination again; 2)For the research projects with low yield or low success rate of patent transformation, there may be teachers applying for patent awards only, and universities should formulate reasonable patent award and review mechanism; 3)In the context of high returns from patent transformation, the optimal teacher performance assessment period is at the end of the research period. Improving the assessment rewards and the academic value of teachers' research achievements can effectively improve the level of teachers' optimal research quality and efforts; 4) A lenient assessment and reward program is more applicable. Under the policy of a high percentage of proceeds from the conversion of patents earned by faculty and the academic environment that places more emphasis on reflecting the value of teachers or research teams, universities should adopt a lenient assessment and reward and punishment scheme; Under the policy of a high percentage of proceeds from the conversion of patents earned by school and the academic environment that places more emphasis on highlighting the value of universities, universities should adopt a strict assessment and reward and punishment scheme.

Key words: high-quality scientific research, assessment reward and punishment, patent examination, game theory, numerical analysis

CLC Number: