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Articles

Green Supply Chain Game Models and Revenue Sharing Contract with Product Green Degree

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  • 1. College of Economics and Management, Xi'an University of Technology, Xi'an 710054, China;
    2. College of Economics and Management, Hubei Automotive Industries Institute, Shiyan 442002, China

Received date: 2013-07-20

  Revised date: 2014-02-08

  Online published: 2015-07-22

Abstract

The living standards and environment requirements of consumers are greatly improved as the rapid development of the global economy. And the transformation of economic development mode is driven by consumers demands,so the green supply chain mode considering resource consumption and environmental impact is adopted, which based on the traditional supply chain. In this context, how to work with the retailers downstream supply chain, how to determine the wholesale price w and product green degree g for manufacturers; How to respond to the needs of consumers and manufacturers, to determine the optimal product prices p for retailers; As well as how to establish coordination mechanism between the two to coordinate their interests, all these are the problems to be solved.
Based on the above issues, the Stackelberg game and Nash Equilibrium game theories are used to establish game models in this paper,and the Revenue Sharing Contract theory is used for coordinating green supply chain members. Firstly, four game models are established based on manufacturer and retailer,and their optimal decision variables are determined. Furtherly, Four game models are conducted a comparative analysis in terms of product green degree, product price and wholesale price.On this basis, further consideration of using revenue sharing contract is taken to coordinate manufacturers and retailers.Finally, a numerical simulation is given in order to validate the models.
It is shown that the product green degree is the highest in case of centralized control mode, while it is the lowest in case of stackelberg game led by manufacturer.In management practice, in order to promote consumers to buy a higher degree of green products, manufacturers and retailers can implement revenue sharing, and the revenue sharing coefficient range should be (0.40,0.48]for the best. The data used in numerical simulation, is primarily collected through surveys of green industries, manufacturing companies, retail companies and consumers, as well as reference to the relevant literatures.The game behaviors and coordination strategies of the green supply chain inside members are discussed in this paper, and it promotes the research about green supply chain from the outside supply chain to inside.In addition,a preliminary green supply chain coordination model from the perspective of quantitative research is provided is this paper.

Cite this article

JIANG Shi-ying, LI Sui-cheng . Green Supply Chain Game Models and Revenue Sharing Contract with Product Green Degree[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2015 , 23(6) : 169 -176 . DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.201.06.022

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