Considering the emotion impact on the behavior of players in Game Theory, the RDEU Game model of group conflict was built, involving the rank-dependent utility theory. Moreover, the existence of Nash Equilibrium under different emotional states was and disecused the behavioral mechanism of players' mixed strategy choice influenced by emotion was analyzed in this paper. The findings demonstrate that emotion has significant impact on Game Equilibrium of group conflict. When the player has a “pessimistic” emotion, he or she tends to choose the behavior of resisting. Similarly, the player tends to submit to the other player when he or she holds the emotion of optimist. It was also found that players could be influenced by a certain judgment made by the other player, who was driven by emotion when selecting strategies. For example, when vulnerable groups think that if the probability of the opponents' adopting a repressed strategy is below a certain cut-off point, the probability of their choosing resisting strategy will increase, with the optimism index of emotion generating higher levels, At last, the conclusions were analyzed numerically, taking an example of house dismantlement conflict.
XIONG Guo-qiang, ZHANG Ting, WANG Hai-tao
. Closed-loop Supply Chain with Contract-recycling System[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2015
, 23(9)
: 162
-170
.
DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2015.09.020
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