In the criterion of low-carbon power dispatching,the impacts of mitigation technologies and their synergy effects on low carbon load demand and the bounded rationality learning process of grid corporation purchasing electricity are considered. The stochastic differential game models for vertical cooperative mitigation when a power supplier applies three low-carbon technologies are developed. The equilibrium application of mitigation technologies,stable expectation and variance of electricity purchases in Stackelberg game and cooperative game are obtained respectively,and the optimal mitigation payment proportion in Stackelberg game is got with Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman Equation. The effects of symmetry and application quantity of mitigation technologies on the feedback equilibria are investigated,and the feedback equilibria in these two game structures are comparatively analyzed. A profit-sharing contract based on bidirectional weighted Rubinstein-Stahl bargaining model to coordinate the decision system is presented,and the basic models are extended to cooperative mitigation models with multiple mitigation technologies. The results indicate that mitigation input increases electricity purchases of the grid corporation in a certain condition and range,and the power supplier is to accept greater risk for the attempt. The cooperative game is more suitable for optimizing the power source structure of electricity market and complying with the policy orientation of low-carbon power dispatching. The optimal application of mitigation technologies,stable expectation and variance of electricity purchases,and systemic equilibrium profits are positively correlated with the investment efficiency,synergy effects between technologies and the quantity of the selected low-carbon technologies.
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