At present, the bid for online advertising position is an important way for many advertisers to promote their products, and online advertising position auction has become the most important means to make profits for the search engine. In our country, the profit-driven nature of the advertising position auction mechanism causes a large number of false advertising and a wide public controversy. Those advertisers with high bids do not always bring good experience to search engine users. This has become important issues needed to be solved by search engine. In this paper, a creditable effective auction mechanism is presented, considering not only the reputation of advertisers but also the experience of users. A symmetric Nash equilibrium is defined, characterizing the equilibrium bidding strategy of the advertisers and showing that the allocation is effective under our mechanism. Compared with the GSP mechanism of ranking only by bid, it is found that user satisfaction is improved, which increases the competitive advantage of the search engine. In addition, our mechanism may help to improve advertisers' reputation and has advantage in raising search engine's long-term balanced revenue and auction efficiency. Our conclusion is demonstrated by numerical simulation.
HE Ji-wei, LIU Shu-lin
. Research on the GSP Mechanism with Advertiser Reputation and User Experience[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2015
, 23(12)
: 150
-156
.
DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2015.12.018
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