In this paper, how innovators of different fairness preference types choose their innovation strategies with the method of Agent-based Computational Economics and EWA learning model is analyzed. Through giving the agents different types of fairness preference (narrow self-interest type, competitive preference type, difference aversion type and social welfare preference type), agents' choosing behaviors among four kinds of innovation strategies are observed, such as inside-out open innovation, outside-in open innovation, coupled open innovation and closed innovation. The results showed that when the innovators possess the characteristic of narrow self-interest, the number of innovators who choose the strategy of closed innovation is the same as that who choose the strategy of outside-in open innovation, and they are more than numbers who choose the strategies of inside-out open innovation and coupled open innovation. When the innovators possess competitive preference, the ones who choose the strategy of closed innovation are more than those who choose the strategy of outside-in open innovation. When the innovators possess the characteristic of difference aversion, the innovators who choose the strategy of inside-out open innovation will reduce, who choose the strategy of coupled open innovation will nearly disappear. When the type of innovators is social welfare preferences, the innovators who choose the strategy of closed innovation can increase.
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