With the two-echelon supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and a single supplier as its research object, the manufacturer and the supplier's optimal quality management strategy, revenue and the total revenue of the entire supply chain in four different game situations are anylyzed. The results showed that when the income distribution between the manufacturer and the supplier met certain conditions, it was a Pareto improvement for the manufacturer, the supplier and the whole supply chain system from quality management Nash non-cooperative game situation, to weak incentive Stackelberg game situation, to the strong incentive Stackelberg game situation, and finally to the cooperation quality management game situation. Therefore, the cooperation quality management game situation was the ideal situation during the process of supply chain quality management. In order to promote the realization of the situation effectively, Nash bargaining model was applied to analyze the allocation of the remaining profits in the supply chain system between the parties. Finally, based on the simulation data got from the survey on the supply chain of an electric fan manufacturer, a numerical example was given to verify the results of the theoretical derivation.
HONG Jiang-tao, HUANG Pei
. Research on Quality Coordination in Supply Chain Based on Differential Game[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2016
, 24(2)
: 100
-107
.
DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2016.02.013
[1] Flynn B B, Flynn E J. Synergies between supply chain management and quality management:Emerging implications[J]. International Journal of Production Research, 2005, 43(16):3421-3436.
[2] 蒲国利,苏秦,刘强. 一个新的学科方向——供应链质量管理研究综述[J]. 科学学与科学技术管理, 2011, 32(10):70-79.
[3] Hsieh C C, Liu Yute. Quality investment and inspection policy in a supplier-manufacturer supply chain[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2010, 202(3):717-729.
[4] Xie Gang, Wang Shougang, Lai K K. Quality improvement in competing supply chains[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2011, 134(1):262-270.
[5] 朱立龙,于涛,夏同水. 两级供应链产品质量控制契约模型分析[J]. 中国管理科学, 2013, 21(1):71-79.
[6] Zhu Kaijie, Zhang R Q, Tsung F. Pushing quality improvement along supply chains[J]. Management Science, 2007, 53(3):421-436.
[7] Xie Gang, Yue Wuyi, Wang Shouyang, et al. Quality investment and price decision in a risk-averse supply chain[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2011, 214(2):403-410.
[8] Reyniers D J, Tapiero C S. The delivery and control of quality in supplier-producer contracts[J]. Management Science, 1995, 41(10):1581-1589.
[9] Yao Dongqing, Zhang Nanyun. Contract design for supply chain quality management[J]. International Journal of Value Chain Management, 2009, 3(2):129-145.
[10] 胡军,张镓,芮明杰. 线性需求条件下考虑质量控制的供应链协调契约模型[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2013, 33(3):601-609.
[11] Zu Xingxing, Kaynak H. An agency theory perspective on supply chain quality management[J]. International Journal of Operations & Production Management. 2012, 32(4):423-446.
[12] Nerlove M, Arrow K J. Optimal advertising policy under dynamic conditions[J]. Economica, 1962, 29(114):129-142.
[13] 张雄会,陈俊芳,黄培. R & D过程中供应商纵向知识溢出决策分析[J]. 工业工程与管理,2008, 13(4):29-31.
