Low-carbon policies have been implemented by governments to reduce carbon emissions in recent years, which bring new challenges to firms' operation and supply chain management. Under low-carbon economy, the supply chain members have risks caused by asymmetric carbon information, including carbon emission and carbon price information. Under such circumstances, a two-echelon supply chain involved one manufacturer and one retailer is developed, where the manufacturer is the leader and the retailer is the follower. With carbon trading policy, the misreporting behavior of the supply chain members and their influences on supply chain performance are ivestigated based on "Benchmarking" carbon quota allocation mechanism. The study analytically shows that under the condition that the manufacturer has carbon information advantages and seeks the maximum profit, his misreporting behavior has no effect on his own performance as well as the supply chain performance. However, conclusions are drawn that the retailer, who is in a subordinate position, will lie about the information when he has the advantages of carbon information. The lying behavior of retailer will increase the profit of both the retailer and the supply chain, but decrease the profit of the manufacturer. Such behavior cannot lead to the maximum supply chain performance. In this paper,the revenue sharing contract is used to coordinate the supply chain.Furthermore,this work derives the reasonable range of the revenue sharing contract coefficient,under which the profit of the supply chain can be maximized. It can also motivate the retailer to reflect the carbon information honestly.
YANG Lei, ZHENG Chen-shi, JI Jing-na
. Misreporting Decisions and Coordination in Supply Chain under Asymmetric Carbon Information[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2016
, 24(4)
: 111
-120
.
DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2016.04.013
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