At present, the air pollution control mode of local government includes territory management and cooperation management, and the experts have reached a consensus on the cooperation management of air pollution control. Based on the evolutionary game, the behavior evolutionary path and stability strategy of local governments in the process of air pollution control are analyzed, and then the factors of the formation and stability of cooperation management alliance among local governments are discussed.By compared the four situations of evolutionary game, including territory management without the restriction of central government, territory management with the restriction, cooperation management without the restriction, and cooperation management with the restriction, the result shows that territory management that might cause the free-rider problem against the air pollution control whether it is under the central government control or not,and the policy from central government would be dysfunctional in such a situation. On the other hand, local governments' behavior evolutionary path in the situations of cooperation management without the restriction of central government and the one with restriction are similar, the stability strategy is no governance or cooperation management. But with the restriction, local governments could form the cooperation management alliance efficiently and effectively. So in order to build the cooperation management alliance of air pollution control among local governments and make it stable, the central government should add restrictions to local governments in the process of air pollution control, and local governments need to improve the cooperation benefit and decrease the cooperation cost.
GAO Ming, GUO Shi-hong, XIA Ling-ling
. Analysis on the Formation and Stability of Cooperation Management Alliance of Air Pollution Control Among Local Governments: Based on the Evolutionary Game[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2016
, 24(8)
: 62
-70
.
DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2016.08.008
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