As the discarded electronic products emerging and social environmental protection consciousness enhancement, the recycling and disposal of discarded electronics becomes one of the major problems. In the existing literature, scholars pay more attention to the influence of prices or tax policy on recyclers or processing business operation efficiency, but research on the key problem of motivation in reverse supply chain, that how to determine the price of reverse supply chain and subsidies, is relatively rare. In this paper, a Stackelberg model is presented to determine prices and socially optimal subsidy fees in decentralized reverse supply chains where each entity independently acts according to its own interests based on the perspective of social welfare maximization. Social welfare model can test incentives of prices and subsidies in the dispersion management system in the reverse supply chain. Through the comparison of social welfare model and fund balance model, and comparing cases of numerical calculation, in which data collected from market of smart phone in Taobao website. When considering the cost of the appropriate decision mechanism, the research results can provide policy makers with a social welfare perspective. The results show that: MIS and recyclers behave at the equilibrium status by choosing optimal selling quantity in the market and optimal reward money for customers bringing E-Waste products to recyclers. The impact of choke-off price, sensitivity of price with respect to the quantity demanded, base collected quantity of zero reward money, and sensitivity of the collected quantity with respect to the reward money on the value in the social welfare model is better than fund balance model. In addition, our analysis results show that the government is encouraging the MIS to improve their production processes to reduce pollution costs, or selling products containing fewer pollutants, so no-recycling of electronic waste products would not lead to high cost of pollution, it also shows that cost of reducing pollution is lower than that of repairing.
WANG Xi-gang
. The Research on Recycling Product Pricing and Subsidy Policy of E-Waste in Reverse Supply Chain[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2016
, 24(8)
: 107
-115
.
DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2016.08.013
[1] Hong I H, Assavapokee T, Ammons J, et al. Planning the e-scrap reverse production system under uncertainty in the state of Georgia: A case study[J]. IEEE Transactions on Electronics Packaging Manufacturing,2006, 29(3): 150-162.
[2] Eichner T, Runkel M. Efficient policies for green design in a vintage durable good model[J]. Environmental and Resource Economics, 2005, 30(3): 259-278.
[3] Lavee D, Regev U, Zemel A. The effect of recycling price uncertainty on municipal waste management choices[J]. Journal of Environmental Management, 2009, 90(11): 3599-3606.
[4] Kulshreshtha P, Sarangi S. "No return, no refund": An analysis of deposit-refund systems[J]. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2001, 46(4): 379-394.
[5] 王文宾,张雨,范玲玲,等.不同政府决策目标下逆向供应链的奖惩机制研究[J].中国管理科学,2015,23(7):68-76.
[6] 柳键,曾剑锋.征收补偿政策对家电逆向供应链运营策略与绩效的影响[J].广东财经大学学报,2014,29(5):27-39.
[7] 于春海,李想.闭环供应链双渠道回收系统定价机制与协调策略[J].东北大学学报(自然科学版),2014,35(9):1360-1364.
[8] 付小勇,朱庆华, 赵铁林.基于逆向供应链间回收价格竞争的回收渠道选择策略[J].中国管理科学,2014,22(10):72-79.
[9] 王先甲,张柳波.基于改进线性分成契约的逆向供应链协调机制[J].系统工程理论与实践,2014,34(3):701-709.
[10] 李锦飞,刘坪,贡文伟.考虑政府奖惩的逆向供应链定价策略研究[J].工业工程与管理,2013,18(4):109-116.
[11] Bansal S. Market provision of quality: Impact of economic growth[R]. Working paper, Centre for International Trade and Development, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India, 2012.
[12] 孙嘉轶,滕春贤,陈兆波.基于回收价格与销售数量的再制造闭环供应链渠道选择模型[J].系统工程理论与实践,2013,33(12):3079-3086.
[13] 蹇明,陈志刚.策略性信息泄露情形下的逆向供应链回收定价策略[J].计算机集成制造系统,2014,20(8):2000-2007.
[14] 王文宾,陈祥东,达庆利,等.制造商竞争环境下逆向供应链的政府奖惩机制研究[J].运筹与管理,2014,23(3):136-145.
[15] 易俊,王苏生.基于成本——收益分析的逆向供应链网络演化机制分析[J].管理工程学报,2013,27(2):123-128.
[16] Hong I, Ke J S. Determining advanced recycling fees and subsidies in "E-scrap" reverse supply chains[J]. Journal of environmental management, 2011, 92(6): 1495-1502.
[17] Savaskan R C, Van Wassenhove L N. Reverse channel design: the case of competing retailers[J]. Management Science, 2006, 52(1): 1-14.
[18] Pishvaee M S, Torabi S A. A possibilistic programming approach for closed-loop supply chain network design under uncertainty[J]. Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 2010, 161(20): 2668-2683.
[19] Bennekrouf M, Sari Z. Multi-objective multi-level closed loop supply chain design[J]. Management, 2013, 3(5): 266-272.
[20] Lee C H, Chang S L, Wang K M, et al. Management of scrap computer recycling in Taiwan[J]. Journal of Hazardous Materials, 2000, 73(3): 209-220.
[21] Chien M K, Shih L H. Relationship between management practice and organisation performance under European Union directives such as RoHS: A case-study of the electrical and electronic industry in Taiwan[J]. African Journal of Environmental Science and Technology, 2007, 1(3): 037-048.
[22] 孔令丞,骆唐杰.基于合同理论的逆向供应链定价策略研究[J].管理学报,2012,9(4):594-602.
