Problem origin- With the rise of complex product systems(CoPS) collaborative development, the linear cooperative mode of university-industry cooperation(UIC) in the past does not adapt to the current innovation activities, and is gradually being replaced by the network mode. The network model is still on the initial stage, and there are some problems about cross-organizational coordinated management,talents accumulation, knowledge flow effectively, benefit allocation and so on.
Accurate narration of the problem- Industrial technology innovation strategy alliance is taken as an example, the interests coordination problem of innovation subjects in the process of cooperation is studied from the perspective of contract design. The structure of university-industry cooperation network mode is similar with the scale-free network and can be regarded as the structure of core-participating subject. The core subject and the participating subjects engage in UIC with contract. In order to pay the remuneration of the participating subjects, the core subject takes out a portion of the profits as a reward to the participating subjects in addition to the fixed remuneration. Therefore, how to allocate the profits to effectively promote every participating subjects to work hard according to the contract is the focus of this paper.
Design/methodology/approach- Based on Shapley value, using knowledge sharing, the subject of knowledge level, the amount of investment and the ability of resisting risk as the main measurement factors of interests coordination, interests coordination mode of university-industry network cooperation is built. At same time, cooperative ability is condered as adjustment coefficient in order to optimize the interest allocation.
Thinking-First of all, in the background of the industrial technology innovation strategy alliance, the assumed condition is described and benefit allocation model of university-industry network cooperation is set up. Secondly, in the above model, the core subject, how to coordinate interests is analyzed. That is to find out the factors of interests coordination, determine comprehensive evaluation method of the factors, and optimize the distribution of interests with the network collaborative capability. At last, with the optimization of the interests coordination, the benefit allocation of industrial technology innovation strategic alliance is designed.
Research findings- Through the factor of network coordination ability, the optimization of the interests coordination of the participating subjects is realized. In the optimized benefit allocation model, if the participants in the high level of work, it should be a positive return; if the low level of work, it should be negative return.
Data explanation of the case- Taking rail transport in Jiangsu Province industry technology innovation strategic alliance for example, nodes 6, node 15 and node 16 of the UIC network diagram are respectively analyzed. The result is the interests of node 6 declining, and the drop part of the benefit value is incorporated into the node 15 and node 16. That means the collaborative innovation ability of node15 and node 16 in the alliance are strong, and the collaborative innovation ability of node 6 is weaker than the other two nodes.
Effect and value- In the allocation of interests of the innovation subjects, the cooperative ability between the subjects is taken into atcount, and a reference method is provided for the interests coordination of the university-industry network cooperation.
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