Based on the present group procurement regulation for medicines, a bilateral bargaining game between two competing pharmaceutical enterprises and one government-oriented procurement platform is proposed to investigate pharmaceutical enterprises' pricing strategies, profit allocation mechanisms between two enterprises and one procurement platform, and key factors influencing pharmaceutical enterprises' willingness to participate in group procurement. The impacts of group procurement regulation on pharmaceutical enterprises' pricing strategies, profits, providers' procurement costs as well as the allocation efficiency of the medicine market are also discussed. The main results are as follows: First, group procurement regulation for medicines will lower prices and the whole procurement costs for medical providers but does not necessarily improve the social welfare. Second, firm's willingness of participation in group procurement increases with its own group procurement efficiency and its rival's bargaining power, and decreases with its rival's group procurement efficiency and its own bargaining power; Third, a firm higher bargaining power does not necessarily gain higher profit. The final profits of firms depend on the combined factors including enterprise's bargaining power, group procurement efficiency, and its rival's bargaining power and group procurement efficiency. Last, group procurement regulation for medicines does not necessarily lead to lower profits for both pharmaceutical enterprises. On some conditions, two enterprises can achieve "Win-Win" under group procurement regulation. In a word, our results provide practical significances for enhancing pharmaceutical firms' willingness to participate in group procurement, promoting the coordination between pharmaceutical firms and the group procure organization, giving full paly to the advantage of group procurement, and improving the allocation efficiency of the medicine market.
ZHANG Xin-xin, HOU Wen-hua, Shen Cheng-lin, HE Qiang
. Willingness to Participate in Group Procurement, Pharmaceutical Enterprises' Bargaining Power and Performance of Medicine Market[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2017
, 25(7)
: 113
-122
.
DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2017.07.013
[1] Healthcare Supply Chain Association (HSCA). A primer on group purchasing organizations: questions and answers [R].2011.
[2] 王列军,葛建华.医院药品集中采购政策的背景和演变 [J]. 中国卫生政策研究, 2009, 2(4):8-13.
[3] 何芬华,力晓蓉.中国药品集中招标采购历程的文献研究:1999-2010[J]. 中国卫生政策研究,2011, 4(4):64-70.
[4] 李宪法.政府主导的药品招标已难以为继[J]. 中国医院院长, 2013, (17):45.
[5] 高军,侯玉岭,赵一帆.药品集中招标采购给中国制药产业灾难性打击—全国人大代表刘群谈药价虚高背后的问题[N]. 首都医药, 2014, (7):35.
[6] 石文凯,王广平,刘人才.新医改政策对我国医药产业发展的影响分析[J]. 中国药业, 2011, 20(24):5-6.
[7] Burns L. The health care value chain: Producers, purchasers, and providers [M]. Boston:Jossey-Bass, 2002.
[8] Schneller E. The value of group purchasing in the healthcare supply chain [R]. Tempe,Arizona:Arizona State University, 2005.
[9] Burns L R, Lee J A. Hospital purchasing alliances: Utilization, services, and performance [J]. Health Care Manage Review, 2008, 33(3):203-215.
[10] Hu Qiaohai, Schwarz L. Controversial role of GPOs in healthcare-product supply chain [J]. Production and Operations Management, 2011, 20(1):1-15.
[11] Hu Qiaohai, Schwarz L, Uhan A. The impact of group purchasing organizations on healthcare-product supply chain [J]. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2012, 14(1):7-23.
[12] 刘西国,王健.以系统论视角解析药品集中采购困境[J]. 中国卫生经济,2012, 31(6):20-22.
[13] 刘西国,王健,王镇.药品集中采购的制度性缺陷及解决途径[J]. 中国卫生经济, 2012, 31(3):33-34.
[14] 郭春丽.中国药品生产流通:体制现状、存在的问题及政策取向[J]. 经济学家, 2013, (9): 24-33.
[15] 王振平,方锐.药品采购"二次议价"的社会效用损失研究[J]. 价格理论与实践, 2013, (3):54-56.
[16] 陈波.完善政府定价机制推进药品阳光采购—广东医疗机构药品网上集中招标采购工作的理性思考[J]. 价格理论与实践, 2007,(12):22-24.
[17] 王强,毛华.集团采购组织在药品采购中的降价机制与发展阶段的经济学分析[J]. 中国卫生政策研究, 2011, 4(8): 66-70.
[18] 王增鑫,尹畅,刘西国,等.药品集中采购制度下药价虚高的成因与制约[J]. 中国卫生经济, 2014, 32(4):72-74.
[19] 陈富良,吴晓云.药品集中招标采购中的逆向选择问题解析—一个兼顾价格与质量的信号传递模型[J].宁夏社会科学, 2010, 59(2):45-48.
[20] Stefano C, Rosella L. Reconciling social and industrial goals: A bargaining model to pricing pharmaceuticals [R]. Working Paper,Universita Cattaneo,2005.
[21] 陈敬贤,马志强,孟庆峰. 线性量折扣方案下团购策略对渠道绩效的影响[J]. 中国管理科学, 2014, 22(1):110-119.
[22] 唐方成,池坤鹏. 双边网络环境下的网络团购定价策略研究[J]. 中国管理科学,2013, 21(3):185-192.
[23] Ganuza J, Llobet G, Dominguez B. R&D in the pharmaceutical industry: A world of small innovations [J]. Management Science, 2009, 55(4):539-551.
[24] Frutos M, Ornaghi C, Siotis G. Competition in the pharmaceutical industry: How do quality differences shape advertising strategies? [J]. Journal of Health Economics, 2013, 32(1):268-285.
[25] Nash J. The bargaining game [J]. Econometrica, 1950, 18(2):155-162.
[26] Osborne M, Rubinstein A. Bargaining and markets [M]. San Diego:Academic Press, 1990.
[27] 黎东生,王婕.药品集中招标采购制度对医药企业的影响分析[J]. 中国卫生事业管理,2014, (7):504-506.
