In the electronic commerce, consumers are more difficult to perceive the product quality and trust the quality of online goods compared with the traditional business mode. Quality assurance strategy has become one of the important means to win the trust of consumers and improve the competitive advantage of the electronic commerce platform. Relatively few researchers analyze the problem of quality assurance decision from the perspective of two-sided markets. So in this paper, the characteristics of three types of e-business platform modes, including platform mode, reseller mode and hybrid mode, are analyzed bilateral quality assurance efforts of supplier and electronic commerce enterprises as well as product quality impact on demand function are studied, and their quality assurance strategy game model is developed based on two-sided markets. Through comparing their results, it is showed that the hybrid mode is preferred both to reseller mode and platform mode, the optimal quality efforts of e-business enterprise under platform mode is lower than reseller modes, and the optimal quality efforts of supplies is higher than reseller modes. If suppliers' moral hazard is more important than e-commerce enterprises' moral hazard, the platform mode is better than the reseller mode, and the optimal quality under the platform mode is higher than reseller mode. Lastly, three operating modes are analyzed considering internal competitive. It is found that the platform mode is superior to the hybrid mode; the hybrid mode is superior to the reseller mode if single homing percentage of suppliers and quality efforts satisfies some conditions, and internal competition is conducive to the development of the platform mode. The conclusions of this paper offer a theoretical reference for the quality management decision of e-commerce enterprises.
GUI Yun-miao, GONG Ben-gang, CHENG Yong-hong
. Research on Quality Assurance Strategy of E-commerce Platform Considering Bilateral Effort[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2018
, 26(1)
: 163
-169
.
DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.01.016
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