In a product and service supply chain (PSSC) consisting of an ERP vendor, an APP vendor and a customer enterprise with incomplete information, adverse selection and moral hazard problems exist in the collaboration between the ERP vendor and the APP vendor when they provide an ERP product service system (PSS) to the customer enterprise jointly. The ERP vendor provides advanced software development technology and industry solution in the development of the ERP system while the APP vendor provides mobile application based on the ERP function to the ERP vendor. The ERP vendor sells the ERP product service system to the customer enterprise and both the ERP vendor and the APP vendor provide after-sales service to the customer enterprise jointly. Specifically, the APP vendor provides the maintenance and upgrading services of the APP system while the ERP vendor provides the maintenance, upgrading and secondary development services of the ERP system. To analyze how the product and service quality, performance of the PSSC system and profit of the ERP vendor are affected when the APP vendor chooses to conceal or reveal its capacity information, a model of two-stage dynamic game is constructed. Moreover, a single stage contract based on information disclosure and revenue sharing and a two-phase contract with contract revision are put forward in this paper and values of two contracts are compared. It is found that the ERP vendor can identify the APP vendor's capacity information through the observation of the APP vendor's contract menu selection during the product development phase and thus revises the contract based on available information during the service stage. This can help improve the product and service quality and reduce the risk of the ERP vendor, leading to the improvement of channel profits and achievement of Pareto improvement. Finally, numerical examples are provided to inspect and illustrate the research conclusions. In summary, the collaboration problem of multi-stage mobile application product service system with information upgrading and contract revision under incomplete information is researched, and theoretical guidance and decision-making basis are provided for enterprises to implement mobile management pattern.
ZHANG Xu-mei, REN Ting-hai, ZHOU Mao-sen, DAN Bin
. The Contract Revision of Cooperation of Multi-stage Mobile Application Product and Service under Incomplete Information[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2018
, 26(2)
: 126
-141
.
DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.02.014
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