With the increasing awareness of environmental protection, the green travel is getting more and more attention. However, in terms of the green car rental, there are few studies on the cooperation mechanism between the green car rental company and the city government. Therefore, this paper will study the relationship between them by applying the supply chain coordination contract theory.
Firstly, considering a two-echelon system which is composed of a green car rental company and a government, the game model between them is built with the assumptions that the demand rate is random and depends on the government's promotion efforts. Secondly, the optimal decisions of fleet sizing and promotion effort level under the decentralized decision, the centralized decision and a combined contract based on revenue sharing and cost sharing are researched respectively, and a comparative analysis is carried out. Finally, the example analysis is employed to verify the reliability and validity of the above models.
The following results is attained:the system can't achieve coordination under the decentralized decision; the introduced combined contract of revenue sharing and cost sharing can not only achieve system coordination but also make the members of the system achieve Pareto improvement when the contract parameters satisfy certain conditions. The example analysis illustrates that the two parties can achieve the integrated optimal profit only through cooperation. the proposed cooperation mechanism between the green car rental company and the city governmentcan provide an innovative theoretical basis for further related researchs.
JING You-guo, GUO Pei-qiang, QIN Kai-da
. Coordination Contract for Green Car Rental System with Promotion Effort Dependent Demand Rate[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2018
, 26(3)
: 94
-100
.
DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.03.010
[1] Köchel P, Kunze S, Nieländer U. Optimal control of a distributed service system with moving resources:Application to the fleet sizing and allocation problem[J]. International Journal of Production Economics, 2003, 81-82:443-459.
[2] 陈旭. 基于收益管理的汽车出租定价与车辆配置[J]. 系统工程理论与实践, 2005, 03:264-267.
[3] Fink A and Reiners T. Modeling and solving the short term car rental logistics problem[J]. Transportation Research Part E:Logistics and Transportation Review, 2006,42(4):272-292.
[4] George D K and Xia C H. Fleet-sizing and service availability for a vehicle rental system via closed queueing networks[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2011,211(1):198-207.
[5] You P and Hsieh Y. A study on the vehicel size and transfer policy for car rental problem[J]. Transportation Research Part E:Logistics and Transportation Review, 2014, 64:101-121.
[6] Wu P L, Hartman J C, Wilson G R. An integrated model and solution approach for fleet sizing with heterogeneous assets[J]. Transportation Science, 2005,39(1):87-103.
[7] 刘德文, 鲁若愚. 基于粒子群算法的短期汽车租赁服务的调度优化问题研究[J]. 管理评论, 2011, 12(2):166-173.
[8] Li D and Pang Z. Dynamic booking control for car rental revenue management:A decomposition approach[J]. European Journal of Operational Research, 2017, 256:850-867.
[9] Krishnan H and Kapuscinski R. Coordinating contracts for decentralized supply chains with retailer promotional effort[J]. Management science, 2004, 50(1):48-63.
[10] Xing D and Liu T. Sales effort free riding and coordination with price match and channel rebate[J]. European Journal of Operational Research. 2012, 219(2):264-271.
[11] Bernstein F and Federgruen A. Coordination mechanisms for supply chains under price and service competition[J]. Manufacturing & Service Operations Management, 2007, 09(3):242-262.
[12] Giri B C and Bardhan S. Coordinating a two-echelon supply chain through different contracts under price and promotional effort-dependent demand[J]. Journal of Systems Science and Systems Engineering. 2013, 22(3):295-318.
[13] 何丽红, 廖茜等. 两层供应链系统最优广告努力水平与直接价格折扣的博弈分析[J]. 中国管理科学,2017,25(2):130-138.
[14] 曲道钢, 郭亚军. 分销商需求与其努力相关时混合渠道供应链协调研究[J]. 中国管理科学, 2008, 16(3):89-94.
[15] 胡本勇, 陈旭. 考虑努力水平和决策风险偏好的供应链期权销量担保模型[J]. 管理工程学报, 2012, 26(3):184-190.
[16] 庞庆华, 蒋晖. 需求受努力因素影响的供应链收益共享契约模型[J]. 系统管理学报, 2013, 22(3):371-378.
[17] 曹二保, 郑健哲等. 双渠道供应链应对需求扰动的协调机制研究[J]. 管理学报, 2014, 11(2):267-273.
[18] 时茜茜, 朱建波等. 重大工程供应链协同合作利益分配研究[J]. 中国管理科学,2017,25(5):42-51.
