Construction activities have a significant impact on the environment; green innovation in construction project depends on participants' cooperation efforts, green cooperation is an important way to promote the green innovation performance of construction projects. Taking behavior preference influence into account in behavior decision-making process is closer to the reality, and altruistic preference is one of the behavior preferences which will influence the cooperation behavior decision significantly. Based on a Stackelberg model between the leader and other participants of construction project, green efforts(including self-working effort and cooperative working effort) decision making process is analyzed with the consideration of altruism preference in decentralized and centralized decision context. Conclusions are as follows:(1)In most cases, the altruistic preference has a positive effect on the participant's effort, but the extent of influence and the direction of influence are affected by the decision context and the altruistic preference difference between participants. Participants' self-working effort has nothing to do with altruistic preference in decentralized decision context, while cooperative working effort only has positive correlation with his own altruism preference. In the centralized decision context, two kinds of efforts have a positive relationship with their own altruism preference, and negatively associate with partners' altruistic preference. The altruistic preference difference between participants will also affect the effect of altruism preference. The one who has stronger altruistic preference is willing to offer more self-working and corporative efforts in cooperation, while the one who has weaker altruistic preference will probably have an opportunistic tendency to reduce the level of effort in certain conditions. (2) Income distribution will affect both self-working effort and cooperative working effort of participants, but difference between participants' altruistic preferences will change the income distribution effect on efforts decision, namely altruistic preferences will also affect participants' efforts decision indirectly through income distribution; (3) The income distribution, altruistic preferences difference, working costs, social reputation and other factors will affect the altruism preference. A fair distribution of income will have a positive guidance effect on participants' altruism preference, and also a reasonable cooperative tasks and moderate social reputation incentive will induce altruistic behaviors effectively. In conclusion, contexts and related factors are necessary to be taken into account in the study of the altruistic preferences' influence in the behavior decision, which will make the research findings more realistic.
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