During the past few decades, the environmental protection has emerged as a hot topic in the whole society and changed consumer behavior, which is also included in recent market surveys. It shows that most consumers prefer to buy those products with lower environmental damage even if they cost a little bit more. Undoubtedly, consumer environmental awareness (CEA) is an important market force that can create incentives for firms to invest in the development and adoption by green innovation. In this context, many manufacturers have been actively engaging in designing and producing environmentally friendly products to obtain the corresponding competitive advantage. Besides the green innovation effort taken by the manufacturer, the advertisement effort, which conveys products' greenness properties, taken by downstream retailer also plays an important role in affecting green consuming and is a critical lever to enhance supply chain profitability in the marketplace. In order to encourage the retailer to engage in advertising, manufacturer often partially shares the retailer's promotion cost. Thus, when facing these issues, how to coordinate the manufacturer and retailer to maximize the supply chain profit has gradually absorbed the concerns and debates of any scholars.
In this paper, for one manufacture-on retailer supply chain, those who perceive different risk attitude, assuming that the demand function is the common knowledge of both parties, a bi-level risk decision model based on the mixture CVaR criterion is constructed. Based on Stackelberg game and method, the manufacturer's optimal green innovation effort, the proportion of the advertising costs that manufacturer shared, the retailer's optimal advertisement level, members' performance and the total performance of the supply chain in decentralizeas well as in centralized decision-making mode are investigated and compared. Besides that, the analysis of investigating the impacts of decision markers' different risk attitudes on related decision variables and supply chain efficiency are also made. The result shows that the centralized decision-making equilibrium has more advantage. According to the comparison, a two-way cost sharing coordination mechanism that incorporated the risk compensation is proposed. With this contract, both manufacturer and retailer achieve the Pareto improvement in a reasonable transfer payment region. Finally, a numerical analysis is conducted to validate the effectiveness of the contract and the impact of members' different risk attitude on supply chain efficiency is also presented.
The research shows that the optimal green innovation effort and advertisement level decreased with the decision maker's risk-averse degree,increased with the decision maker's risk-seeking degree in both decentralized decision setting and centralized decision setting. In the decentralized decision-making setting, it is effective, but only if their risk attitude parameters and profit margins meet certain condition, to encourage the retailer to improve advertisement level by means of manufacturer shares advertisement costs. Besides, no matter what risk attitudes the supply chain member perceive, the two-way cost sharing coordination mechanism which incorporated the risk compensation can always coordinate supply chain. And this coordination mechanism has a remarkable effect on performance improvements of the supply chain which consisted of a risk-averse manufacturer and a risk-seeking retailer. The research of this paper provides a basic idea and framework to related research of green supply chain coordination which incorporating decision makers' risk attitude and the heterogeneous of CEA. Meanwhile, the paper also plays the role of guiding manufacturer and retailer of green supply chain to make their operations decisions.
QU You, GUAN Zhi-min, YE Tong, TAO Jin
. Supply Chain Coordination for Green Innovation-advertisement Decisions Based on Mixture CVaR Criterion[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2018
, 26(10)
: 89
-101
.
DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.10.009
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