Realizing the transformation of China from a big automobile country to a powerful automobile country, the development of its own brand cars is imperative. Faced with increasingly fierce market competition, the own brand cars' weak plate are more and more prominent in the technology innovation and the brand premium capacity. As an industry with a high degree of industrial correlation, the strategic deployment of vehicles is relatively complicated. The reconstruction of the value system of self-owned brand cars involves a number of stakeholders, involving not only information uncertainty but also market demand. It is necessary to restrain the relationship between the profit and loss of the relevant subjects so as to make the behavior of the multi-party players tend to be gradual and stable, realizing the best balance of system benefits. By constructing an evolutionary game model among government, enterprises and consumers, the paper analyzes the relationship of profit and loss, the tendency of its behavior strategy to be asymptotically stable in the process of value reconstruction of the own brand cars in China, using MATLAB to simulate the evolution process of tripartite interaction, proving the influence of the change of important parameters on the system evolution. The results show that the main factors influencing the reconstruction of the value of own brand cars are government incentives, industrial value-added benefits, additional costs and opportunity losses, the reconstruction of value must adopt a strategy from different levels and take a multi-pronged approach, highlighting the guiding role of the government and the leading role of enterprises; we can focus on reconstructing the value system of China's own brand car from implementing self-owned brand car revitalization plan, government intervention plan of automobile consumption side and self-brand car image reshaping plan based on the strategy interaction among the three parties, in order to boost the development of China's automobile industry, making the high quality and good brand image of own brand cars rooted in consumers mind, achieving our own brand car nirvana rebirth with a new look for the market's goal.
GUO Ben-hai, WANG Han
. Study on the Value Reconstruction of Own Brand Cars in China Based on Multi-Player Game[J]. Chinese Journal of Management Science, 2018
, 26(10)
: 140
-151
.
DOI: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2018.10.014
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