Pursuing economic performance is the driving force for the sustainable development of state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Improving comprehensive performance is the basic requirement of the central and local governments and the general public for SOEs. How to improve the economic and comprehensive performance by optimizing the allocation of non-state-owned shareholders’ decision-making participation right is a key issue that needs to be solved in smoothly promoting the SOEs mixed-ownership reform. Although there have been many research results in the effect factors of SOEs’ performance and the relationship between non-state-owned shareholders' ownership and corporate performance, most of the existing literature use relevant data samples to conduct empirical research on the relationship between non-state-owned shareholders’ decision-making participation right and corporate performance. The theoretical mechanism of non-state-owned shareholders’ decision-making participation right affecting the SOEs’ performance has not been revealed, and the different effects of non-state-owned shareholders’ decision-making participation right on the economic and comprehensive performance of SOEs have not been explained.
Based on the multi-task principal-agent relationship between state-owned and non-state-owned shareholders and executives, a mathematical model is constructed to theoretically reveal the effect mechanism of non-state-owned shareholders’ decision-making participation right on the economic performance and comprehensive performance of SOEs. Then, taking the listed A-share state-owned companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2010 to 2019 as samples, and the non-state-owned shareholders’ decision-making participation right is measured by the proportion of the number of directors, supervisors and senior executives appointed by non-state-owned shareholders to the total number of directors, supervisors and senior executives of SOEs, and the economic performance of SOEs is measured by the return on total assets, and the comprehensive performance of SOEs is measured by a comprehensive index covering economic performance and social performance based on the entropy method, the results of the theoretical model are empirically tested by using multiple panel regression model and nonlinear regression model. The following main results are obtained. The non-state-owned shareholders’ decision-making participation right would positively affect the SOEs’ economic performance. There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between SOEs’ comprehensive performance and the non-state-owned shareholders’ decision-making participation right. The findings of this study provide theoretical and empirical evidence for further optimizing the SOEs control rights structure and smoothly promoting the SOEs mixed-ownership reform.
Based on the above theoretical and empirical research results, combined with the operation practice of Chinese SOEs and the goal of mixed-ownership reform, the following policy suggestions are put forward. First, in the process of SOEs mixed-ownership reform, we should not only pay attention to the optimization of the equity structure but also emphasize the sharing of control rights between state-owned and non-state-owned shareholders. It is necessary to promote the transformation of Chinese SOEs from the "formal" mixed-ownership reform dominated by mixed equity to the "substantial" mixed-ownership reform with equity mixing and control rights coordination by optimizing the equity structure and control rights structure at the same time. Second, while emphasizing the non-state-owned shareholders’ decision-making participation right, should be not ignored the decision-making participation right enjoyed by state-owned shareholders in SOEs. The state-owned and non-state-owned shareholders’ claim for control rights should be considered and coordinated. The non-state-owned shareholders’ decision-making participation right should be kept at an appropriate level. Different shareholders should enjoy decision-making participation right that matches their equity. The sustainable development of China's SOEs is ensured by forming a stable equilibrium state of control rights.