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E-Retailer’s Strategy of Disclosing Competitor’s Price Based on Customer Trust
LI Xin-jian, WU Chun-mei, HUANG Ming-xue, LI Chong-guang, LI Xiao-ling
2011, 19 (5):
122-128.
Whether to disclose competitor's price is a dilemma for an E-retailer.To analyze this question,our research builds a utility model of consumer demand,based on E-retailer's reputation,product price,and customer trust.Our game analysis results points out that there would be different results contingent on the different orientation and the reputation of E-retailer.For demand increasing,homogeneous E-retailers should maintain previous choice.For revenue improving,homogeneous E-retailers should disclose competitor's price,heterogeneous E-retailer prefer to set higher price under his demand predominant situation.For consumer surplus improving,homogeneous E-retailer should maintain his previous strategies; if these E-retailers have different reputations,the E-retailer with high reputation will improve more if both of them disclose competitive price,the E-retailer with low reputation will benefit more if there is only one discloses competitive price.
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