With the development of the digital economy, the competitiveness and influence of brands are enhanced with continuous incremental innovation of products. However, after leading firms putting new products into the market, the following firms quickly produce a variety of imitated products to compete for the limited market shares. And the encroachment of following products is becoming much more popular. According to their innovation ability, leading innovation strategy or following innovation strategy are adopted by manufacturers with different market positions to implement product innovation. As the following manufacturers encroach, conflicts between horizontal channels emerge, which leads to more complex relations within vertical channels. As a result, different research and development (R&D) strategies are adopted by leading and following manufacturers, i.e., outsourcing R&D (D) or in-house R&D (C) to cope with fierce competition, which contributes to the diversified channel structures of the leading and following firms.
Based on the following product encroachment, manufacturers’ R&D strategies are studied under different R&D capabilities of the channels. Considering manufacturers’ innovation R&D strategies and the following products’ encroachment strategies, the Stackelberg-Nash game models under different market structures and channel structures are constructed. With backward induction, the equilibrium decisions and profits under six modes (i.e., DN, CN, DD, DC, CD, CC) are obtained. Furthermore, the influence of following product encroachment, the factors of the coefficient of quality, the imitative level and differentiated innovation capabilities on quality innovation and profits are explored. Additionally, the selection of the leading and following manufacturers’ R&D mode, the encroachment strategy of the following manufacturer and the deterrence strategy of the leading manufacturer are analyzed.
The results show that when owning a large innovation advantage, the leading manufacturer copes with product encroachment by enhancing quality, which improves the firm’s profits; otherwise, the leading manufacturer responds to product encroachment by lowering prices, resulting in a certain loss of profit. Meanwhile, internal innovation abilities can promote the manufacturers’ profits, but the quality cost coefficient has the opposite effect. When technological differences between the leading channel and the following channel are large, the increase of the following level promotes the leading manufacturer’s profits, and as the following level changes, the following manufacturer’s profits fluctuate repeatedly. When the difference in the innovation ability is large, it is better for the leading manufacturer to adopt outsourcing R&D, otherwise, it is advisable to choose in-house R&D; in addition, the following manufacturer’s outsourcing R&D mode brings additional profits to the leading manufacturer. When implementing outsourcing R&D, the following manufacturer possesses strong ability to resist external risks, and when competition is small, in-house R&D mode can generate more profits for the following manufacturer.