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主管:中国科学院
主办:中国优选法统筹法与经济数学研究会
   中国科学院科技战略咨询研究院

Table of Content

    25 June 2024, Volume 32 Issue 6 Previous Issue    Next Issue
    An Empirical Study on the Dynamic Evolution of Crude Oil Market Pricing Power Based on Multi-scale Information Share Model
    Changqing Luo,Lan Liu,Huiming Zhu,Min Zhang
    2024, 32 (6):  1-12.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.0732
    Abstract ( 270 )   HTML ( 30 )   PDF (2393KB) ( 328 )   Save

    Crude oil market pricing power is of great significance to the construction of a high-standard market system and the improvement of factor market operating mechanism. To judge the impact of Shanghai crude oil futures on the pricing power of the crude oil market, a time-varying information share model is constructed based on a multi-scale analysis method to empirically test the dynamic evolution of China’s crude oil market pricing power. The spot price of Daqing crude oil, prices of Brent crude oil futures, WTI crude oil futures, and Shanghai crude oil futures from December 2001 to November 2020 are adopted as the research sample. The research results show that: (1) the price of crude oil futures dominates crude oil market, and the pricing power of each market is relatively stable during the sample period, but it can be affected by extreme events; (2) Shanghai crude oil futures gain a 28.84% pricing share and has shown certain pricing power after its launch, however, its pricing power has much room for improvement on the whole and on high-frequency and medium-frequency time scales. (3) under different time scales, the evolution of crude oil market pricing power shows the characteristics of heterogeneity. On the high-frequency scale, Shanghai crude oil futures receive 31.54% of the pricing power after its introduction. Despite of this pricing power, it does not fill the gap which is caused by the decrease of the pricing power of Daqing spot market. On the medium-frequency scale, the pricing share of Shanghai crude oil futures is lower than pricing power of other frequency domains. On the low-frequency scale, after the introduction of Shanghai crude oil futures, with a pricing share of approximately 45.58%, INE has gained a dominant role. To improve the pricing power of Shanghai crude oil futures, the improvement of the market operation mechanism should be focused on the improvement of pricing power on the high frequency and medium frequency time scales.

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    Reward Size, Ability Distribution and Incentive Effects of Crowdsourcing: A Model Analysis on All-Pay Auctions
    Zhengchi Liu,Bo Liang,Tao Ma
    2024, 32 (6):  13-21.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2019.0802
    Abstract ( 158 )   HTML ( 16 )   PDF (2763KB) ( 223 )   Save

    Crowdsourcing brings together crowdwisdom to realize open innovation. However, commercial practice of many crowdsourcing sites shows that the variations of users' abilities and submission quality are restricting its development. For example, China ’s leading crowdsourcing platform, ZhuBaJie, was established similarly to Taobao, but its development is obviously not comparable to e-commerce.Why do such awkward situations arise? Compared with traditional outsourcing, crowdsourcing is known for its advantages of “low cost” and “low threshold”. In view of this, the requester's expectations of getting higher submission quality with fewer rewards and the user's motivation of experience out of rewards have become stronger. At the same time, crowdsourcing platforms often lower the participation threshold in pursuit of transactional popularity, which has led to a mix of “low-cost” requesters and “low-capacity” users. According to the classical information economics theory, under the influence of adverse selection caused by asymmetric information, the "high price" requesters and “high-capacity” users gradually withdrew, which resulting in a rapid increase in participation but a serious regression in submission quality.Existing research usually takes reserve quality (task requirement) as the sole criterion of rewards and ignores the willingness to pay of requesters, such as their expectation of getting higher submission quality with fewer rewards. The “reward size” of the requester in the all-pay auctions model, and endogenous reward are introduced by combine quality and payment expectation to explore the incentive effect of the reward size on crowdsourcsing.The difference between crowdsourcing and outsourcing is the word “crowd”. A large amount of literature describe the properties of users only in the individual perspective. The individual ability of the users and their group heterogeneity are focused on. By introducing “ability distribution” to describe the characteristics of requesters, it is found that the incentive effects of reward size may different in different directions, so the requesters need to adjust rewards according to user group’s characteristics.To explore the incentive effects of reward size and user groups’ ability distribution on crowdsourcing participation and submission quality, a single-prize crowdsourcing model in a simultaneous all-pay auction under incomplete information is built. It is found that: Firstly, users' optimal bidding strategies depend on their own abilities in all-pay context. Secondly, user groups’ heterogeneity determines the incentive effects of crowdsourcing. A higher reward induces significantly more participation and higher submission quality when the abilities of user group vary greatly. On the contrary, a higher reward decreases participation and submission quality. Lastly, depending on the variation of user groups’ ability distribution, the incentive effect may show different characteristics in different stages. A unique enlightenment for the operation of crowdsourcing sites is provided: participation and submission quality can not be achieved at the same time, trade-offs must be made to achieve optimal incentives.

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    Research on the Modeling of Default Risk Contagion of Guarantee Circle Based on Directed Complex Network
    Han He,Sicheng Li
    2024, 32 (6):  22-33.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.0297
    Abstract ( 210 )   HTML ( 12 )   PDF (2616KB) ( 317 )   Save

    Guarantee circle risk has always been a hot issue that the government and enterprises pay more attention to. The negative effect of the "domino" caused by it not only endangers the local financial ecology, but also creates regional financial risks, and even cross-regional contagion, posing a huge threat to the Chinese economy. It is of great practical significance to establish a reasonable risk contagion prediction model according to the contagion characteristics of the guarantee circle, and to carry out targeted prevention and control in advance.The current research on risk contagion modeling based on complex network is still mainly based on the financial network formed between banks. The risk contagion modeling with the guarantee circle as the object is also mostly studied from the perspective of undirected network and complete mutual aid network. The risk contagion in the guarantee circle is directional, and the risk is generally contagious in one direction along the guaranteed direction. Therefore, the existing research cannot fully reveal the contagion path of the guarantee circle, and it is difficult to propose reasonable control measures.Based on this, a directed complex network based on the directional characteristics of default risk contagion in the guarantee circle is constructed in this paper. Practical issues such as guarantees, guarantees, bankruptcy and withdrawal from the guarantee circle are considered.Relevant parameters such as in-degree, out-degree, and bankruptcy rate are incorporated into the model to construct an improved SIRS model. Further, based on the guarantee information of national non-financial listed companies from 2008 to 2019 in the China Stock Market & Accounting Research Database, a large-scale, multi-node, complex structure and cross-provincial guarantee circle is constructed. 32 listed companies and 2,667 unlisted companies are included in the guarantee circle. Taking the real link of the guarantee circle as an example, the prediction and simulation of the risk contagion in the guarantee circle are carried out, and the breadth and speed of the default risk contagion in the guarantee circle are reasonably predicted. The combined prevention and control strategies of the government, enterprises and banks for simulation are set to explore the impact of different combined prevention and control strategies on risk contagion.The main conclusions of this paper are: (1) The peak of the infected company is most sensitive to the infection rate, while the peak of the bankrupt company is the most sensitive to the cure rate. (2) When the in-degree and centrality of the feature vector of infecting companies become larger, the peak of infection of the companies in the guarantee circle will increase, the speed of reaching the peak of infection will become faster, and the duration of the default risk infection will become longer. (3) The prevention and control effect of the combined rescue strategy is better than that of the single rescue strategy. Enterprises strengthen their own cash flow management to reduce the infection rate is the key to risk prevention and control. The effective play of the government's rescue strategy depends on the cooperation of multiple parties.The main contribution of this research is to study the risk contagion model based on the directional characteristics of the guarantee circle, which helps to better simulate the risk contagion link of the guarantee circle in our country. This research has certain guiding significance for governments, banks and enterprises to strengthen risk monitoring and prevent and control major financial risks.

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    Does Excess Control of Family Board Seats Affect Corporate Risk-Taking?
    Chun Su,Xing Liu
    2024, 32 (6):  34-45.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.2020
    Abstract ( 148 )   HTML ( 5 )   PDF (2289KB) ( 205 )   Save

    As a control strengthening mechanism, excess family board seats will enable the controlling family to make risk decisions according to their wishes, which may affect the risk-taking level of family firms. As a matter of fact, the responsibility for the failure of the board decision is often shared by all shareholders, while the benefits obtained from the successful decision are decided and distributed by the controlling family, which makes the family have the motivation to choose high-risk and high-yield investment projects, so as to obtain the private benefits of control rights. When the degree of excess control of family board seats is higher, the independence of board is usually lower. At this time, the controlling family is more motivated and able to obtain private benefits of control rights by investing in the above-mentioned high-risk projects, which makes the family firms face higher operating risks, furthermore leading to an increase in the level of corporate risk-taking.To verify the above inferences, a sample of family firms listed on Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares is selected through the sub-database of private listed companies in the CSMAR database, and key data such as the number of family directors and family control rights are manually collected. Other corporate governance data and financial data come from the CSMAR database and the RESET database. The sample period is from December 31, 2008, to December 31, 2017. The independent variable excess control degree of family board seats (ECFBS) is measured as the difference between the proportion of boardseats controlled by the family and the family control rights. The risk-taking level of the dependent variable is represented by Risk, which is characterized by the rolling range and rolling standard deviation of Roa in the next three years. In addition, three moderator variables are introduced: controlling shareholder equity pledge (Pledge_dum, Pledge), company information transparency (Transparency), and institutional shareholding ratio (InsHold). On this basis, the mechanism and effect of the excess control of family director seats on the risk-taking level of corporate are examined.It is found that the degree of excess control of family board seats is significantly positively correlated with the level of corporate risk-taking. Further analysis finds that the controlling shareholder’s equity pledge will weaken the positive correlation between the degree of excess control of family board seats and thelevel of corporate risk-taking; Higher corporate information transparency or institutional shareholding ratio will reduce the positive impact of excess control degree of family boardseatson the level of corporate risk-taking.The mechanism analysis shows that the controlling family’s acquisition of private benefits of control rights is an important mechanism for the excess control of family board seats to affect the level of corporate risk-taking.Finally, after controlling for potential endogeneity problems and conducting a series of robustness tests, the research conclusions still hold. It not only enriches the relevant research on the economic consequences of excess control of family board seats but also provides more explanations for the venture capital behavior of family firms in this paper.

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    Digital Empowerment Strategies of E-commerce Platform and Competitive Merchants
    Qiang Hu,Jiaping Xie,Guangsi Zhang
    2024, 32 (6):  46-56.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1414
    Abstract ( 221 )   HTML ( 11 )   PDF (2455KB) ( 338 )   Save

    With the development of digital economy, digital construction has attracted attention from all walks of life. The government is accelerating the digital reform to improve the modernization of government governance, and enterprises are accelerating digital transformation to seek a living space in a new market environment. Digital empowerment can improve the operational efficiency of enterprises, and better serve consumers and create greater business value through demand creation, value co-creation and supply chain reconstruction. For example, Alibaba’s “Business Staff” data services, more than 30 million merchants have enjoyed the data services brought by Alibaba’s big data technology. Amazon’s “Selling Coach” allows merchants to track several key indicators on Amazon.com, including sales, traffic, and conversion rates. Therefore, it is of practical significance to study how e-commerce platforms implement digital empowerment strategies and whether the merchants choose to accept paid digital empowerment services.Two competitive merchants settled on an e-commerce platform are considered in this paper, and a digital empowerment strategy that is a fee-based data service provided by the e-commerce platform to merchants is studied. The Hotelling model is used to characterize the market demand, and the Stackelberg game models between the e-commerce platform and the competitive merchants are constructed in four scenarios: (i) No digital empowerment (ND); (ii) Digital empowerment is only accepted by the relatively superior merchant (DH); (iii) Digital empowerment is only accepted by the relatively inferior merchant (DL); (iv) Digital empowerment are accepted by both merchants (DD). According to the game equilibriums, the implementation plan of the digital empowerment strategy of the e-commerce platform is discussed, and the two merchants’ choices of the digital empowerment service are analyzed. Finally, the conclusions are verified by numerical examples, and the impacts of important parameters on the profits of all parties and the implementation and selection of the digital empowerment strategy are intuitively reflected.In this paper, the main conclusions and managerial implications are summarized as follows: (i) Whether merchants decide to accept the digital empowerment service depends on the charging standard, and the level of the charging standard also affects the Nash equilibrium of the two competitive merchants. The game equilibrium conditions of only the relatively superior merchant and both merchants choosing to accept the digital empowerment service, and the conditions of both merchants choosing not to accept the digital empowerment service are obtained. (ii) The e-commerce platform can determine the digital empowerment scenario based on the principle of profit maximization, and the optimal charging standard of digital empowerment service and the e-commerce platform’s digital empowerment level under each digital empowerment scenarios are obtained. Based on this, the e-commerce platform carries out strategic investment in the field of big data and implementation of digital empowerment strategies. (iii) The degree of difference between the superior and inferior merchants in the market (mainly refers to the difference between the level of data application by merchants and the unit production cost of products) is more conducive to promoting e-commerce platforms to invest in the field of big data, relatively speaking, e-commerce platforms prefer digital empowerment for superior merchants to inferior merchants, and expect that the quality of merchants is different, rather than convergent. For example, the quality of merchants settled on e-commerce platforms such as JD.com and Tmall.com is diversified. (iv) To a certain extent, the digital empowerment strategy leads to intensifying the market competition. As far as the relatively inferior merchants are concerned, they need to improve their level of data utilization and reduce the unit production cost to narrow the gap with the superior merchants, thereby enhancing their competitiveness in the market.The e-commerce platform’s digital empowerment strategy and competitive merchants’ choices of the digital empowerment service are explored, which can guide the ecommerce platform to implement digital empowerment strategies and help guide the formulation of charging standards and the investment intensity of digital empowerment. In addition, a reference for whether merchants choose to accept the digital empowerment service is provided, including relatively superior and inferior merchants. It enriches the theory of platform-based operations and supply chain management for this paper.

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    Pricing Strategies of Enterprises under Servicizing Business of Sharing Economy
    Chunqiao Tan,Jinzhan Li,Xiaohong Chen,Zhicheng Deng
    2024, 32 (6):  57-67.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.0115
    Abstract ( 229 )   HTML ( 12 )   PDF (2122KB) ( 260 )   Save

    In recent years, with the development of the sharing economy and the enhancement of people's awareness of environmental protection, a new business model and consumption model has gradually emerged---servicizing business. With the continuous development of servicizing business, enterprises have produced a variety of pricing methods. In the case of considering the pooling effect, three different pricing methods exist in the servicizing model of the sharing economy: pay-per-use mode (PPU) and monthly card mode (MC), and a hybrid mode (HM) in which two pricing methods coexist, the optimal pricing method selection of enterprises with the goal of maximizing profits and optimal pricing strategies is studied under different modes, and the environmental friendliness of different business models and the impact of pooling effect on the optimal operating strategies of enterprises is discussed. Research shows that the three pricing methods under the servicing model all have the optimal pricing that maximizes the profit of the enterprise; in the hybrid model, consumers with lower demand frequency prefer the PPU mode, and consumers with higher demand frequency prefer MC mode, and lowering PPU pricing will effectively expand the market size; when the pooling effect is strong, the company should choose the PPU model with the highest profitability and higher environmental friendliness, and when the pooling effect is weak, the company should choose MC mode with more stable profit. The operational decision-making suggestions for enterprises are provided under the servicizing mode of the sharing economy to promote the sustainable development of servicizing business.

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    Collaborative Optimization of Charging Network and Charging Strategy with Practical Battery Wear Model
    Zhihong Huang,Weilai Huang,Fang Guo
    2024, 32 (6):  68-78.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1636
    Abstract ( 209 )   HTML ( 14 )   PDF (2025KB) ( 257 )   Save

    Electric vehicles (EVs) have attracted increasing attention in the field of logistics owing to the strong support received from the government and the continuous increase in social environmental awareness. Compared to traditional logistics vehicles, EVs have additional charging costs such as charging time cost and battery wear cost. In this study, the routing problem of EVs is formulated as an integer programming model based on a nonlinear charging model and a practical battery wear model. Subsequently, a three-phase algorithm called SIGALNS is proposed for solving it. Based on the proposed model, a series of instances are generated showing the benefits of combining charging time, battery wear and distribution. Finally, sensitivity analyses are systematically conducted on wearing cost and charging time under a realistic background. The results show that the optimal planning of an EV network considering time and wear costs is in line with the practical needs of EV logistics enterprises; this can help reduce operating costs. The results of this paper demonstrate the impact of charging strategy on the cost of electric logistics vehicle logistics service network from a practical perspective, and propose a collaborative optimization scheme of distribution scheduling and charging plan to reduce the comprehensive operating cost of enterprises. The models and algorithms proposed in this study can provide a decision-making basis for logistics enterprises that use electric logistics vehicles as delivery vehicles to make operational decisions.

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    Improvement of the Optimization Method for the Capacity Allocation of Bulk Industrial Materials Transportation
    Ying Han,Ruijia Zhao,Peiyu Jin,Xinlian Xie
    2024, 32 (6):  79-85.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1727
    Abstract ( 136 )   HTML ( 8 )   PDF (1378KB) ( 175 )   Save

    When considering the dispatching of ships on routes in different navigation areas on a global scale, due to the long distance between different navigation areas, the time for ships to dispatch between different navigation areas is also long. However, the optimization method used in the past to allocate ships on different routes in the same navigation area cannot take into account this effect. In order to solve this problem, a ship dispatching strategy in different navigation areas is designed first with the goal of minimizing dispatch cost, and then with the goal of minimizing total cost, a two-stage mixed integer nonlinear optimization model of bulk industrial material transportation capacity allocation is built. Aiming at this complex model, a two-stage solution method is designed. Compared with models and corresponding algorithms that directly aim at minimizing the total cost, the two-stage solution method can obtain the optimal solution more accurately and quickly, and the larger the problem size, the more obvious the optimization effect. The research results show that the two-stage optimization method has more practical application value for the decision-making of shipping companies' capacity allocation in different navigation areas.

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    Research on Optimization Strategy of Food Delivery Crowdsourcing Delivery Considering Order Preference
    Xingguang Chen,Xinyu Li,Luqiang Cheng
    2024, 32 (6):  86-97.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1262
    Abstract ( 210 )   HTML ( 8 )   PDF (2648KB) ( 234 )   Save

    With the gradual development of the sharing economy model of food delivery, the current food delivery has changed from the original stage of market expansion to the connotative development stage of improving service quality. The mobile crowdsourcing distribution model in the current mainstream food delivery is focused on, and the optimization of the takeaway crowdsourcing distribution strategy is discussed considering the order destination preference. Firstly, three models are established that consider the service speed of the distribution system, the total income of the distributor and the waiting time of the customer as the optimization goals. Secondly, a calculation example is designed to verify the model. According to the order matching range radius, the ideal order distribution rate and the delivery staff's basic income and other parameters, the optimization strategy of the delivery system to minimize the waiting time of customers and maximize the income of the delivery staff is discussed. The simulation results show that the model proposed in this paper based on queuing theory can better describe the characteristics of actual food delivery crowdsourcing, and the relevant conclusions have theoretical value and practical significance in the operation and management of the food delivery industry.

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    Technology Licensing and New Product Introduction: Based on the Perspective of Multination Competition and Cooperation
    Liang Jin,Haitao Lu
    2024, 32 (6):  98-108.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1794
    Abstract ( 138 )   HTML ( 6 )   PDF (2223KB) ( 214 )   Save

    In recent decades, with the in-depth development of technological progress and economic globalization, transnational licensing has become a driving force for the development of China. Technology licensing can not only improve the technological level of enterprises and adjust existing products, but also promote enterprise innovation to achieve higher levels of productivity. In this context, the following three questions are studied: 1) How should the licensor choose a transnational licensing contracts? 2) What is the relationship between the introduction of new products by the licensee and the multinational technology licensing? 3) Whether the licensor and the licensee can achieve Pareto improvement?In this paper, the optimal design of licensing contracts and strategies are investigated for introducing new products in a system that comprises a foreign innovator and a domestic company. Two game models before and after the introduction of the new product is established. The main work is divided into four parts. Firstly, optimal licensing contracts are proposed and the optimal pricing and R&D decisions are analyzed through solving the model, respectively. Secondly, the foreign innovator’s optimal licensing contracts selection and the nature of the licensing contract are analyzed. To underscore the significance of licensing contracts, the profit shares of companies under various types of contracts are compared. Thirdly, the new product introduction strategy of domestic company and the impact of new product introduction on the system equilibrium are analyzed. Lastly, the potential for Pareto improvement between the foreign innovator and domestic company is investigated, extending the original model to accommodate this analysis.The results show that, in the transnational technology licensing cooperation, the optimal licensing contracts includes fixed-fee licensing contract and two-part tariff licensing contract. Among them, the patent owner can obtain more profits under a fixed fee contract. This conclusion is one of the main innovations of this paper, which theoretically proves the existence of different forms of transnational licensing contracts. Moreover, from the perspective of domestic company, the domestic company will have the incentive to introduce new products. Its value is mainly to reduce the inequality in the distribution of profit shares between foreign innovator and domestic company, and to reduce the proportion of technology royalties. In addition, the system equilibrium will be affected by asymmetric information, including the form of licensing contracts and the profits of individual companies. It can be seen that foreign innovator have lost profits, domestic company can obtain additional information rent, and the two companies can achieve Pareto improvement under certain condition. Finally, based on the model expansion analysis, it can also be found that under different market conditions, the domestic company always have the motivation to choose high-end product introduction strategies or to introduce high-end and low-end products at the same time.In summary, under the trend of economic globalization, a reasonable and effective transnational licensing mechanism is not only an inevitable requirement for promoting high-quality economic development, but also an inherent requirement for expanding opening up. The theoretical analysis results obtained in this paper can provide a theoretical basis and reference for the practice of transnational technology licensing.

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    Service Quality and Pricing Decision of Health Operation with Referral Rate
    Junxiu Jia,Yishu Hou,Li Du
    2024, 32 (6):  109-119.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1516
    Abstract ( 119 )   HTML ( 5 )   PDF (2385KB) ( 194 )   Save

    Due to the improvement of people's health awareness and implement of the ‘Big Health’ government strategy, lots of health service institutions have been established one after another and a new kind of health service supply chain forms in China. The key operation problems in these supply chains, such as service pricing and quality of health service institution and service quality of hospital, are studied innovatively based on the referral between health service institutions and hospitals in the paper.A patient utility model, centralized and decentralized supply chain operations model are built for analyzing the impact of referral service fee on the optimal pricing, service quality and profit. The function of referral rate is this paper’s highlight which is related to health complexity and health service quality. Because the health service supply chain’s efficiency is lowered by the existence of referral service fee, the coordination of supply chain is dealt with by the penalty contract and cost sharing contract.It is found that (1) in a centralized health service supply chain, the optimal health service quality, medical service quality and service pricing can be obtained simultaneously. When health service quality and medical service quality are first determined, the health service price is increased with two service quality above. And then if the medical service quality is first determined, health service quality is negatively correlated with it. Two kind of service qualities are decreased with the health complexity. Health service quality is negatively correlated with referral rate, and health service price and medical service quality are decreased with referral rate. (2) In the decentralized health service supply chain, the medical service quality is decreased with that of health and related with referral service fee, but it is independent of the health service price. Given some an operation condition, the health service quality, medical service quality and the overall profit of the supply chain is decreased with the referral service fee. The profit of health service institutions is also decreased with the referral service fee, while that of hospital is first increased and then decreased. (3) Under a condition, the Pareto improvement of the health service supply chain can be achieved by the penalty contract, but the coordination cannot be realized. While the health service supply chain can be coordinated by the cost sharing contract.

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    Decision-Making Method of Emergency Response Level Considering Riskattitude and Self-confident Behavior
    Lei Zhang,Xin Ye
    2024, 32 (6):  120-128.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1618
    Abstract ( 137 )   HTML ( 5 )   PDF (1775KB) ( 223 )   Save

    The level of emergency response is an important basis for effective, orderly and effective emergency disposal.In the case of increasing complexity, uncertainty and harmfulness of emergency events, decision-maker usually cannot accurately determine the emergency response level in a short period of time, and it is necessary to organize experts in many fields to conduct consultations and judgements. For the decision-making scenarios where experts have different judgements on the response levels, the voting mechanisms, such as the principle of minority obeying majority, cannot be well applied because these decision-making methods based on the deterministic information is not suitable for complex uncertain decision-making in emergency environment. In this paper, both the complexity of experts' risk attitudes and expert self-confidence behavior are considered to resolve the conflicts in the judgement of the response levels, so as to provide support for decision maker to accurately determine the emergency response level. First, a method for generating evidence, that is influenced by experts' riskattitude, is proposed to transform the incomplete judgement information provided by experts into the form of evidence using evidence theory. Then, from the two different aspects of judgement reliability and expert weight, the measurement method of evidence reliability is proposed for the fusion of conflict evidence, and an optimizing decision method of processing different judgements on the response levels is further developed.Finally, the effectiveness and scientificity of the proposed method are verified by an example. The results show that the consideration of experts' risk attitude can improve the accuracy of judgment, and it is beneficial and necessary to consider self-confident behavior in decision making to improve decision quality. There is both theoretical and practical significance for improving the government'semergency management capabilities.

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    Dynamic Emergency Medical Facilities Location for Epidemics under Uncertain Demand
    Yin Xiang
    2024, 32 (6):  129-139.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.2432
    Abstract ( 111 )   HTML ( 4 )   PDF (2421KB) ( 223 )   Save

    In recent years, various epidemics (such as SARS in 2003, H1N1 in 2009, MERS in 2012, Ebola in 2014, etc.) have frequently occurred around the world, causing serious casualties, economic losses and social panic. After the outbreak, how to quickly isolate the infected persons and cut off the source of infection is an effective way to reduce the spread of the epidemic. In reality, the Chinese government has adopted a "multi-level quarantine" strategy in its response to COVID-19 to ensure that infected people are isolated as quickly as possible. On the one hand, the government converts gymnasiums into makeshift hospitals to accept mild patients, and on the other hand, the government also opens designated hospitals to take seriously ill patients. In this context, how to dynamically locate the two types of medical facilities according to the spread trend of the epidemic, and optimize the related resource and patient allocation problems integrally is the key to effectively control the epidemic.Since the 21st century, emergency facility location problems has been widely concerned and deeply studied by scholars. However, existing studies mainly focus on natural disasters such as earthquakes. Although fruitful results have been achieved, relevant models and algorithms are basically limited to the pre-disaster and post-disaster stages, and the commonly used two-stage stochastic planning and two-stage robust optimization are not applicable to the dynamic decision-making requirements of epidemic prevention and control. Compared with natural disasters, the evolution of the epidemic has dynamic and time-varying characteristics, which brings new challenges to the medical facility location problem.In this context, the medical facility location problem under epidemics is addressed as a multi-period and multi-type facility location problem with uncertain demand, as well as the integrated optimization problem of resource allocation and patient transportation. To solve this problem, the dynamic and time-varying characteristics of epidemic evolution are firstly considered, and the rolling horizon approach is used to divide the whole epidemic period into multiple discrete decision-making stages, so as to ensure that location strategies can be optimized and adjusted according to epidemic evolution timely. Secondly, in each decision stage, a robust location model is proposed and embedded into the rolling horizon framework after considering the random deviation between real demand data and the predicted ones. Thirdly, an algorithm is proposed and applied in the case study of COVID-19, which finally verified the validity of the model and the algorithm.

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    Researchon Multi-class Sentiment Classification Based on BERT and Dynamic Ensemble Selection
    Zhongliang Zhang,Qinjun Fei,Yuyu Chen,Xinggang Luo
    2024, 32 (6):  140-150.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1159
    Abstract ( 285 )   HTML ( 19 )   PDF (2270KB) ( 385 )   Save

    To handle semantic deficiency of text feature vector extracted by classic methods and the issue of multi-classsentimentclassification in the text emotion recognition task, a novel multi-class sentiment classification strategy based onBidirectional Encoder Representations from Transformers (BERT) and dynamic ensemble selection (DES) is proposed. First, BERT is used to vectorize the text.Then, the OVO strategy is used to divide the multi-class sentiment classification problem into multiple binary classification sub-problems.Next, the dynamic ensemble selection strategy is developed to construct binary classifier for dealing with each sub-problem.Finally, the final prediction result is obtained based on the aggregation strategy. A public movie review data set is employed to carry out the experimental analysis. The experimental results indicate that(1) the BERT model is helpful in improving the multi-class sentiment classification performancewith respect to these traditional methods, namely TFIDF and Wor2Vec, (2) it is effective to use the DES strategy for dealing with each sub-problem in multi-class sentiment classification, and (3)the performance of the proposed method is also significantlybetter than that of the existing well-known methods for multi-class sentiment analysis.

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    Dynamic Selection of New Product Development Project Portfolio Based on Online Learning with Uncertain Revenue Information
    Chao Fang,Yajing Hu,Weibo Zheng,Gengzhong Feng
    2024, 32 (6):  151-162.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1861
    Abstract ( 156 )   HTML ( 7 )   PDF (2028KB) ( 238 )   Save

    Because of the existence of revenue uncertainty, enterprises often face the dilemma of making accurate decision when selecting new product development (NPD) project portfolio. Most of the existing project portfolio selection models are static that optimize the project portfolio in advance before the period of development, and hence cannot provide decision makers with management flexibility to handle the uncertain. A more common phenomenon is that an enterprise gradually learns the real situation of project revenue and make dynamic adjustments to the project portfolio during the process of project development. Therefore,in this paper an online learning method is employed to study the dynamic selection of NPD project portfolio. Firstly,in view of the dynamics of development process and the uncertainty of revenue information, an optimization model containing three decision types such as project selection, continuation and abandonment is established to maximize the cumulative net profit of the selected project portfolio. Secondly, referring to the idea of the multi-armedbandit in online learning, the value function is reconstructedby transforming the objective function of the original model. Bayesian update is used to realize the online learning of the revenue information by decision makers, and then the dynamic selection policy of project portfolio is proposed. The policy gives the rules of dynamic selection of NPD project portfolio to maximize the value of the projects. Thirdly, in the part of case analysis, the proposed dynamic model is compared with the traditional static model; the influence of decision-makers' risk preference on the objective function in online learning is also explored;and the dynamic selection results of project portfolio under different risk preference are analyzed.Finally, the sensitivity analysis is conducted on the uncertainty degree of project portfolio revenue information. The results show that the dynamic selection policy of project portfolio based on online learning can improve the resource allocation efficiency between projects with different revenues, and reasonable risk preference can improve the cumulative net profit of project portfolio. Compared with the static model, the improvement rate of net profit of the dynamic model is positively correlated with the uncertainty of project revenue information. This study can provide decision support for the dynamic selection ofproject portfolio and upgrade the enterprises’ NPD investment strategy.

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    Equilibrium Analysis of Manufacturers' Digital Transformation Strategy under Supply Chain Competition
    Hua Zhang,Xin Gu
    2024, 32 (6):  163-172.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1572
    Abstract ( 452 )   HTML ( 40 )   PDF (2407KB) ( 654 )   Save

    The digital economy is profoundly changing the fundamental principles and value creation logic of the manufacturing industry and has become a new driving force leading economic growth. However, the digital economy also exerts great pressure on the traditional development model of the manufacturing industry. Some firms implementing digital transformation may not only use their market power to occupy excess monopoly profits but also curb the living space of traditional manufacturers by technological advantages. Therefore, choosing an appropriate opportunity to implement digital transformation is an important decision issue faced by manufacturers.Two competitive supply chains consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer are consided, and dynamic game models are employed to analyze the optimal strategy and game equilibrium of manufacturers' digital transformation. The results show that either of the two manufacturers can maximize its own profits, downstream retailer profits, and supply chain market share by implementing digital transformation ahead of its competitors. It is also found that manufacturers' digital transformation will generate technological shocks and technological spillovers on the competitor who adopt traditional technologies, and the effect of technological shocks is greater than technological spillovers, which not only reduces the competitor's profits but also grabs its supply chain's market share. Regarding the strategic decision of digital transformation, whether the two manufacturers make decisions in sequence or at the same time, both of them implementing digital transformation will have a win-win effect, increasing manufacturers' profits and forming a Nash equilibrium of supply chain competition.Two key contributions are made to the literature. On the one hand, different from the previous research on digital transformation, not only the technological spillovers of digital transformation to incumbent firms are considered but also the impact of technological shocks about digital transformation on market competition is examined. The strategic decision of manufacturers' digital transformation is analyzed from the perspective of supply chain competition and theoretical support is provided for a deeper understanding of the mechanism of digital transformation on market competition. On the other hand, the literature in the field of supply chain competition and dynamic games mainly focuses on the game among firms in the traditional economic context, and seldom pays attention to the new business phenomena in the digital economy. The dynamic game models are used to analyze the Nash equilibrium of manufacturers' digital transformation in supply chain competition, the conditions for achieving a win-win effect between manufacturers are investigated, and the strategic decision for manufacturers is discussed to maximize profits under different strategy profiles, thereby enriching the literature in the field of supply chain competition and dynamic game.

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    Coupon Strategy of E-commerce Brander with Social Responsibility
    Xingli Chen,Jianheng Zhou,Yingxiao Li
    2024, 32 (6):  173-183.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.2174
    Abstract ( 143 )   HTML ( 5 )   PDF (3243KB) ( 257 )   Save

    In the context of e-commerce coupon,coupons have become an important means for branders to sell products.However, the branders with social responsibility have to take the cost of social responsibility and consumer differences into account when adopting coupon strategy.Based on the signaling theory, a strategic interaction model is constructed between the brander with social responsibility and consumers. Because of the restriction from external market, keeping the platform pricing unchanged, coupon strategy is used to signal and focuse on impacts of the cost difference of the brander, consumer sensitivity and the proportion of sensitive consumers on the brander. Our results suggest that: under complete information, as consumers are more sensitive to coupon than to price, the brander will benefit from it,and the profit of the brander increases in the proportion of sensitive consumers.Under incomplete information,when sensitive consumers show a low sensitivity, with a smaller cost difference of social responsibility, the brander with low social responsibility shows a stronger motivation in imitation, and the brander with social responsibility shows more preference to separating strategy and pooling strategy.Additionally,deffer from the results under complete information, duo to the cost of signaling, more sensitive consumers with sense of social responsibility may be adverse to the brander. While, under pooling strategy, it is shown that the brander with low social responsibility can get higher profit through the free riding.

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    Selection of Hybrid Channel Recycling Modes and Carbon Emission Reduction Decisions for the Electric Vehicle Battery Manufacturer
    Chuan Zhang,Yuxin Tian,Mengyu Cui
    2024, 32 (6):  184-195.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.2221
    Abstract ( 206 )   HTML ( 10 )   PDF (2630KB) ( 421 )   Save

    The rapid adoption of electric vehicles (EVs) in China has led to a substantial number of power battery retirements. Establishing an efficient recycling mechanism for these spent power batteries is of pivotal importance. It delves into the selection of recycling modes and the determination of carbon abatement strategies within a closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) governing EV power batteries, operating under the carbon cap-and-trade policy. Four hybrid channel recycling modes are proposed: (1) joint recycling involving the manufacturer and the retailer; (2) joint recycling involving the manufacturer and the third-party recycler; (3) joint recycling involving the retailer and the third-party recycler; (4) joint recycling involving the manufacturer, the retailer, and the third-party recycler. The Stackelberg game model is employed to derive optimal pricing decisions, maximum profits, and carbon emission reduction strategies for different modes. A comparative analysis of optimal profits across distinct modes is performed. In addition, an exhaustive exploration of the influences of pivotal parameters on equilibrium outcomes is conducted.The results show that the optimal carbon emission reduction level for the manufacturer decreases with increasing initial carbon emissions, decreases with a higher carbon emission reduction investment coefficient, and exhibits an initial rise followed by a decline and then another rise with increasing unit carbon trading price. When the sensitivity coefficient of the recycling price exceeds a specific threshold and the competition coefficient of recycling falls below another threshold, the optimal recycling mode for the manufacturer involves joint participation of the manufacturer, the retailer, and the third-party recycler. Otherwise, the optimal recycling mode for the manufacturer includes joint participation by the manufacturer and the retailer, or by the manufacturer and the third-party recycler. The total collecting quantity of retired power batteries in the CLSC diminishes as the competitive coefficient of recycling channels increases, while it rises with an increase in the consumer sensitivity coefficient to recycling prices. It contributes to enhancing the power battery recycling and utilization system for EVs in China, enriching the existing research pertaining to CLSCs for EV power batteries under carbon policies, thereby providing substantive insights for operational decision-making of EV battery manufacturers.

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    The Strategic Choice of the New Development Pattern of “Double Cycle” in the Framework of Inframarginal AnalysisBased on the Analysis of the Sino-US Trade Friction
    Yulin Liu,Jin Xie
    2024, 32 (6):  196-206.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1276
    Abstract ( 118 )   HTML ( 2 )   PDF (2431KB) ( 163 )   Save

    With the rapid economic development and the improvement of international status, China was positioned as a strategic competitor by the United States in 2017, and then a series of policy measures against China were proposed and applied by the US. government, the most important of which was the trade friction. The process of the rise of unilateralism and protectionism has been intensified by the arrival of the Covid-19.The trade structure between the US and China is being changed under the trade friction, which will improve the domestic circulation level of the Chinese economy, and will change the production-consumer utility of the two countries. In May 2020, the new development pattern of “double cycle” was proposed by China, combining China's domestic market advantages under many improvements in the domestic environment to cope with the changes unseen in a century in the international environment including the trde friction the US arose against China. These issues will be discussed in the theoretical model of this paper. Since the change of trade structure involves the problem of corner solution, inframarginal analysis method will be applied in the model of this article. A two-country trade model that contains two goods and divides the domestic and international markets with different transaction efficiency will be constructed.Based on the comparison of the production structure and production-consumer utility between China and the US before and after changes in parameters such as tariff, transaction efficiency, and production technology, the impact of the Sino-US trde friction and the response options of China's “double cycle” new development pattern strategy will be revealed and explained. Based on the theoretical analysis, the digital parameters will be combined with computer simulation technology to simulate and verify the theoretical process. Theoretical and numerical simulation results show that: (i) The trde friction the US arose will lead to distortions in the trading conditions between the two countries, which will damage the export industries of the two countries and benefit the import industries in the short term;(ii) The long-term trade friction will harm the interests of the two countries and increase the distortion of the terms of trade,and the proportion of China's domestic economy will increase; (iii Improving trading conditions and upgrading the production technology will help build a “double cycle” development pattern, which allows China to stimulate the vitality of the domestic market and obtain new sources of economic growth.An explanation is provided for the path of the trade war's impact on China's economy and China's “double cycle” new development pattern. It also provides a new theoretical framework for later research related to changes in the trade structure.

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    Price Decision-making in a Gray Market Supply Chain Considering Reference Price Effect under Quality Information Asymmetric
    Ying Feng,Min Wei,Wenhao He,Yanzhi Zhang
    2024, 32 (6):  207-218.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1571
    Abstract ( 168 )   HTML ( 4 )   PDF (2688KB) ( 164 )   Save

    The gray market has widely existed in many industries. Due to the lack of after-sales service and commodity reputation of gray products, consumers tend to be more sensitive to product price, and more cautious about product quality when buying gray products. Most of them will take the authorized product price in the high price market as an important price reference point, which results in the reference price effect. In addition, information asymmetry in the supply chain will lead to differences in the acquisition of product quality information between manufacturers and consumers. Therefore, manufacturers often face the choice of disclosing or concealing product quality information. A gray market supply chain composed of a manufacturer and a distributor is taken as the research object. Considering the distributor participates in speculation and the consumers’ purchase intention in the gray market is affected by the reference price effect, the influences of product quality information asymmetry on the manufacturer's disclosure strategy choice and the pricing-decision making of the gray market supply chain are explored. Firstly, taking the symmetric quality information as the benchmark, a manufacturer-led Stackelberg game model is constructed. It is found there exists a threshold of the upper limit of consumers' valuation of low-priced products, below (not below) which the gray market exists (does not exist)and the system achieves an interior point (boundary) equilibrium. In the asymmetric information scenario, there exists a unique quality disclosure threshold in the presence or the absence of the gray market, which makes the manufacturer's expected profits equal when disclosing and concealing quality. The threshold is affected by the upper limit of low-priced product valuation and the strength of reference price effect. When the gray market exists, whether the manufacturer chooses disclosure or concealment strategy, the increase of the upper valuation limit of low-priced products and the strength of the reference price effect will inhibit the gray market speculation of distributors. Information asymmetry does not necessarily benefit the manufacturer. It may benefit the manufacturer, only if the manufacturer conceals quality information. The distributor's participation in the gray market speculation will have an adverse effect on the manufacturer when the manufacturer discloses the quality, and while the quality is concealed, whether the distributor participates in the gray market speculation has no effect on the manufacturer. Through numerical simulations, sensitivity analysis of equilibrium solutions is carried out to reference price effect intensity in the case of information symmetry, and manufacturer's quality disclosure strategy and pricing decision under asymmetric information are analyzed. Then, the impacts of quality information asymmetry and distributors' participation in gray market speculation on manufacturer's profit are analyzed. The conclusions of this paper provide theoretical references for exploring the impacts of the quality information asymmetry and the reference price effect on pricing decisions of gray market supply chains, and the choice of manufacturer's disclosure strategy.

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    Pricing Strategy of Platform Competition Considering Crossnetwork Externality
    Fangcheng Tang,Huan Guo,Liyan Chen
    2024, 32 (6):  219-228.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.0703
    Abstract ( 206 )   HTML ( 5 )   PDF (2442KB) ( 240 )   Save

    In recent years, platform economy has gradually become the main driving force to promote economic development, and ecosystem has become an important supporting point for enterprises to keep strategic competition. The layout of ecosystem plays an important role in the development of enterprises, especially the Internet platform. The platform needs to gradually improve its own ecosystem and actively distribute in complementary areas. In fact, new platforms need to compete with existing platforms, different platforms will have fierce competition in order to grab market users in the same field.Under the framework of bilateral market theory, considering the characteristics of platform competition based on the cross network externality, the pricing strategy of the competition between new platforms and existing platforms is analyzed. Using the improved Hotelling model to construct the platform competition game model, aiming at maximizing the platform revenue, it is discussed how the user scale and user conversion cost between platforms affect the pricing strategy in the platform competition, and how the new platform makes the choice of differentiation and compatibility strategy. The platform describes the horizontal differentiation degree of the platform based on the differentiated positioning of different user preferences. The asymmetric state of both platforms is described by user conversion. The greater the user conversion cost, the greater the comparative advantage of the existing platform. The platform can choose whether it is compatible with some users of the competitive platform.The results show that the user scale of platform enterprises is the key source of competitive advantage. The higher the user conversion cost, the greater the pricing power owned by incumbent platform, and the greater the scale advantage of bilateral users of the incumbent platform. The differentiation strategy not only increases the pricing power of new platforms to users, but also increases the profitability of new platforms ultimately. The compatibility strategy changes the pricing structure and user scale of bilateral users of the platform. The platform often charges a low price to the user who belongs to one side of the platform and a high price to the user who belongs to more than one side of the platform. Compatibility will motivate the platform to implement the maximum differentiation strategy. The user conversion cost and the user scale of the existing platform are the biggest barriers for the new platform to enter the market, and the new platform can alleviate the competition intensity with the existing platform by implementing the positive differentiation strategy and compatibility strategy. The platform differentiation will improve the income level of the platform, and the new platform at a disadvantage will prefer the full compatibility strategy, so as to gradually reduce the gap with the existing platform, and improve the pricing advantage and market revenue of the new platform. The research results are helpful to study the pricing strategy of competition between new platforms and existing platforms, to study how new platforms make up the gap between new platforms and existing platforms, and to provide theoretical guidance for the competition between asymmetric scale platforms.

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    Optimal Decisions of Online Video Industrial Chain under Consumer Satiation
    Zhipeng Li,Xiaoyu Zhou
    2024, 32 (6):  229-239.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1706
    Abstract ( 129 )   HTML ( 1 )   PDF (2682KB) ( 276 )   Save

    Considering consumer satiation under both single-homing and multi-homing online video industrial chain structures, the interactive decisions of the content provider, advertiser and video platform on the content price are examined, advertising placement and subscription fee. The impacts of consumer satiation on the players’ optimal decisions and equilibrium welfares are highlighted. The results show that with higher consumer satiation: the content provider is more inclined to adopt an advertising-exclusion content price; the equilibrium decisions and profits of all players are reduced; the homing structures yield less differences in content price, advertising volume, subscription volume, content provider profit, advertiser profit and consumer surplus, but the incumbent platform’s profit under multi-homing is more likely to be higher under that under single-homing. Moreover, ignoring consumer satiation will lead to decreases in subscription volume, consumer surplus, advertiser profit and platform profits, but the profit of content provider may increase.

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    Optimal Pricing and Entry Time for Successive Generations of New Product in a Duopoly
    Feng Li,Qianni Wang
    2024, 32 (6):  240-254.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.0813
    Abstract ( 144 )   HTML ( 3 )   PDF (2767KB) ( 238 )   Save

    Introduction of successive generation product in a duopoly market, the demand is driven by launch time of the next-generation product and product price of two generation products. Several consumer behaviors are also concerned, e.g. leapfrogging adopters whomore prefer the next-generation product when available-named the cannibalization effect, and switching adopters who repeat purchasing the next-generation product. Moreover, product policies of the competitor have also a great influence on the sales and revenue of the firm. Due to the impact of these interrelated factors and its dynamic, the methodology of system modeling and simulationis proposed to solve this problem. A system dynamic model is developed to study decision-making of launch time of the next generation product and pricing strategies for the two generation products. Beside the normal scenario of duopoly with equal bargain power, the scenario of two firms with unequal bargain power is also discussed. According to simulation results, either firm will benefit from accelerating its own next-generation product launch, although demand of the first-generation product is decreasing. Similar opinion is for pricing strategies of the first-generation product. Discounting the first-generation product after the second-generation product is launched, increases the sales of the first-generation product, however it has negative influence on the revenue of the firm. More important, increasing the influence of advertisement and word-of-mouth on potential consumers, keeping consumers active in word-of-mouth marketing campaign would allow firm to delay the launch time or offer higher price for the next-generation product. The firm can also benefit from word-of-mouth marketing strategies, which offer important insights about the firm’s sale efforts.

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    The Retailer's Information Strategy when Receiving Quality Differentiated Products
    Huaqing Hu,Lu Wang,Zehui Ge,Lihua Chen
    2024, 32 (6):  255-266.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.0557
    Abstract ( 176 )   HTML ( 7 )   PDF (2927KB) ( 291 )   Save

    Providing heterogeneous products in different channels is an effective measure for manufacturers to alleviate channel conflicts. Different from the most literature focusing on the manufacturers' differentiation strategy, the countermeasures of retailers are investigated when accepting heterogeneous products (especially low-end products). Considering the retailer's advantages in channel operation and information acquisition, her channel selling strategy is studied under different information structures, then the retailer's information strategy is proposed. It is shown that: 1) Retailers can strategically influence direct selling behavior by taking advantage of first-mover advantages. In particular, when the operating efficiency in the direct channel is low and the potential market size is small, the order quantity can be used as a signal to prevent manufacturers from direct selling. 2) The retailer's information acquisition decision is affected by acquisition cost, product heterogeneity, and direct selling efficiency. In most cases, lower information acquisition costs, lower product heterogeneity, and moderate direct sales channel operating efficiency will lead to higher motivation for information acquisition. 3) When the market potential is large or the product heterogeneity is high, both channel members will reach the consensus on information sharing, in which Pareto improvement can be achieved. It not only lays out suggestions for retailers to deal with product differentiation, but also provides theoretical guidance for the achievement of supply chain information transparency and Pareto improvement in this paper.

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    Incentives for Corporate Social Responsibility in a Group-purchasing Supply Chain under Cooperation and Competition
    Maosen Zhou,Qingyu Zhang
    2024, 32 (6):  267-280.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1391
    Abstract ( 189 )   HTML ( 8 )   PDF (3246KB) ( 280 )   Save

    Although consumers are concerned about social responsibility (SR), they may not be willing to pay for corporate SR behavior in actual purchases. However, most of the literature has examined the incentives for corporate SR based on reciprocity with consumers rather than altruism towards consumers. It is necessary to explore new drivers, which are different from consumers' willingness to pay, for corporations to engage in SR, especially when consumers have insufficient awareness of SR behavior or their actual willingness to pay is not so sensitive to SR attributes of products. To narrow this gap, a supply chain where two competing manufacturers purchase a same component through a common group purchasing organization (GPO) to achieve economies of scale is studied. The manufacturers can endogenously make SR strategies simultaneously by choosing how much consumer surplus should be considered in their production decisions. By developing a stylized model to analyze the coopetition game between the manufacturers with respect to SR level and quantity decisions, the impact of SR levels on operational performance is identified and the equilibrium SR strategies are solved. From this, the impact of group purchasing on SR incentives and their sustainability is untangled, and the sustainable path of group purchasing to value creation is explored.The results indicate that SR can always benefit the GPO and consumers by increasing production while it can benefit the manufacturers only if cooperation dominates. As a result, SR can make both the supply chain and social welfare either better off at low levels or worse off at high levels. In equilibrium, the manufacturers will implement SR strategies only if cooperation and competition are unbalanced. In this scenario, the manufacturers may sink into Prisoner’s Dilemma and suffer losses from SR strategies if competition dominates, whereas SR strategies can also make the manufacturers better off and achieve the Pareto improvement of social welfare if cooperation dominates. Compared to individual purchasing, group purchasing can create values of cooperation and SR by inducing the share of purchasing power and a cooperative relationship between the manufacturers. In particular, when the competition intensity and GPO commission are sufficiently low, group purchasing can sustain SR strategies and thus creates significant social benefit, i.e., improve the consumer surplus and social welfare at the same time. Above all, by demonstrating the mutual promotion on sustainable value creation between group purchasing and corporate SR, we propose a new strategic driver of SR for corporations under competition.

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    Research on Incentive Policy Optimization of Enterprise Ecological Innovation Driving System
    Yanru Liang,Jianzhong Xu
    2024, 32 (6):  281-289.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.2118
    Abstract ( 134 )   HTML ( 5 )   PDF (1798KB) ( 197 )   Save

    In the context of tight environmental regulations, companies have frequent strategic innovations. The purpose of this paper is to drive the spontaneous innovation of enterprises and explore the rational boundaries of environmental regulatory policies. A three-party evolutionary game model is built for the government, the public and enterprises, and linear dynamic penalty schemes and nonlinear dynamic penalty-subsidy schemes are deigned on this basis. The Box-Behnken method is used to solve the optimal coefficient value of the quadratic subsidy function under the nonlinear dynamic scheme. With the aid of simulation tools and Lyapunov's theorem, the stability of the enterprise's ecological innovation behavior in three different stages is double verified. The results show that: (1) The willingness of enterprises to independently adopt ecological innovation under the static scheme is highly random and unstable. (2) The linear scheme can promote the stable but non-optimal state of the system. (3) Under the nonlinear dynamic penalty-subsidy scheme, the system can reach an optimal stable state, and ecological innovation becomes a long-term strategy. The conclusions can provide a reference for the design of nonlinear dynamic incentive policy research.

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    How should Charging Infrastructure Subsidies Assess the Situation? Analysis Based on Multi-party Dynamic Game
    Shuai Ling,Jiyuan Guo,Yue Li,Shoufeng Ma
    2024, 32 (6):  290-300.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.2048
    Abstract ( 161 )   HTML ( 5 )   PDF (1966KB) ( 241 )   Save

    To encourage the development of charging infrastructure, the government has created a series of macro-level incentive programs. On this premise, the charging infrastructure subsidy policies of a number of provinces and municipalities around the nation have been adopted successively, albeit with vastly diverse methods and results. To investigate the incentive effects of different subsidy approaches and the window conditions for policy adjustment, a multi-party dynamic game model with the goal of maximizing the government 's subsidy performance is developed, based on both the number of piles constructed and the operation level of charging infrastructure, and analytical analysis and arithmetic analysis of different subsidy approaches are conducted. It is determined that the government's subsidy plan should reject the one-size-fits-all reward and subsidy standards and need consider the growth of the electric vehicle sector, the operational capability and profitability of charging infrastructure building and operation businesses. Specifically, when the green effect of EVs is insufficient and the operational capacity of charging infrastructure construction and operation enterprises is weak, it is appropriate to adopt construction subsidies; when the green effect of EVs is high and the operational capacity of charging infrastructure construction and operation enterprises is strong, adopting operational subsidies can achieve better subsidy performance. Finally, it is suggested that, in the early stages of charging infrastructure enterprise development, the government should provide subsidies to alleviate pressure on enterprises and promote enterprise investment. As the charging infrastructure industry matures, the government can gradually eliminate subsidies or even taxes if the enterprise's profitability is high enough and the proportion of electric vehicles charging in public charging infrastructure is high enough. This study offers the government with references for adjusting the subsidy system in a timely and effective manner, enhancing the subsidy's efficiency, and promoting electric vehicles more effectively.

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    Research on a Resilience-Oriented Resource Allocation for the Protection and Restoration of Critical Infrastructures Considering Multiple Interdependencies
    Lin Wang,Shenghui Gu,Weilan Suo
    2024, 32 (6):  301-311.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2023.1407
    Abstract ( 152 )   HTML ( 0 )   PDF (2364KB) ( 198 )   Save

    Improving the resilience of critical infrastructures (CIs) and its ability to prevent and respond to various risks is crucial for maintaining economic stability and social security. The optimization of resource allocation among different CI systems and different stages will directly impact the effectiveness of resilience improvement. This involves making resource allocation decisions for all possible or already damaged CI components and for both the pre-disaster protection and post-disaster restoration efforts. The complex interdependencies among multiple risks and among multiple CIs render the resource allocation more challenging. With the goal of maximizing the resilience of CIs, risk interdependencies are integerated into risk scenarios and incorporate CI interdependencies into constraints. Based on network flow theory, a two-stage stochastic programming model is constructed for protection-restoration resource allocation considering multiple interdependencies. The effectiveness of the proposed model is verified using the example of Region H. Resource allocation plans are developed for various risk scenarios, the necessity of considering multiple interdependencies and the combination of protection and restoration in resource allocation decisions is analyzed, as well as identify the marginal diminishing effects of resource investment on resilience improvement. The research findings provide quantitative evidence for the optimization of resource allocation in multi-risk scenarios, multiple CI systems, and multiple stages. This will assist CI regulatory authorities in preventing and mitigating risks, thereby supporting the construction and operation of resilient cities.

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    How does Public Sentiment Affect Enterprise Emission Reduction in the Industrial Symbiosis Chain? Analysis Based on RDEU Game Model
    Lili Ding,Kaixuan Zhang,Lei Wang
    2024, 32 (6):  312-322.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2021.1957
    Abstract ( 190 )   HTML ( 5 )   PDF (1933KB) ( 256 )   Save

    Developing low-carbon economy and promoting the development of industrial symbiosis chain is an important starting point to achieve carbon peak and carbon neutral goals, which is an important way to achieve sustainable development as well. In the process of emission reduction, enterprises of industrial symbiosis chain need to pay high costs. For the sake of interests, some enterprises choose to directly discharge pollutants. Such events tend to trigger various emotions of the public, induce their emotional behaviors and attitudes. Furthermore, it will act on enterprises and influence their behavioral tendencies. In this paper, the Rank-Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU) theory including emotion function is applied to the evolutionary game of enterprise emission reduction within the industrial mechanism of public emotion factors on enterprise emission reduction in the industrial symbiosis chain. Taking the pollution event of circular economy Industrial Park in Yong' an County as an example, the equilibrium analysis and numerical simulation of the four heterogeneous emotion combinations “public and industrial symbiosis enterprises are equally rational”, “public and industrial symbiosis enterprises have emotions (optimism or pessimism)”, “public has emotions (optimism or pessimism), industrial symbiosis enterprises are rational” and “public is rational, industrial symbiosis enterprises have emotions (optimism or pessimism)” are carried out respectively. The results show that when both the public and enterprises are in arational state, the public will passively accept the direct discharge of pollutants by enterprises, and enterprises will directly discharge pollutants.When both the public and enterprises are in a pessimistic mood, moderate pessimism makes the public more willing to accept compromise, and enterprises more willing to choose to symbiosis. However, excessive pessimism is not conducive to the formation of industrial symbiosis chain, and the strategy choice in optimistic mood are opposite. When enterprises are in a pessimistic mood, the deepening of public optimism to a certain extent increases the probability of public collective protest. Finally, relevant countermeasures and suggestions are put forward to guide social emotions from the aspect of emotion management, in order to better realize the emission reduction of enterprises in the industrial symbiosis chain.

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    Robust Optimization Model of Water Environment Treatment Portfolio of Big Rivers for Maximizing Enterprise Income——Taking Yangtze River Protection as an Example
    Jingchun Feng,Yaqi Yan,Ke Zhang,Daisong Hu
    2024, 32 (6):  323-334.  doi: 10.16381/j.cnki.issn1003-207x.2022.0826
    Abstract ( 106 )   HTML ( 1 )   PDF (2039KB) ( 160 )   Save

    The research questions come from national strategies such as the construction of national ecological civilization and the great protection of the Yangtze River, as well as the comprehensive treatment of water environment during the 13th Five Year Plan period and the comprehensive treatment plan of water environment in key river basins during the 14th Five Year Plan Period. It comes from the comprehensive treatment portfolio of the Yangtze River Protection and water environment. One of the objectives of the water environment treatment portfolio of large rivers is to maximize the economic benefits of the treatment enterprises on the premise of ensuring the ecological utility. Therefore, it is necessary to focus on the characteristics of the water environment treatment portfolio of large rivers, such as more and more complex influencing factors, wider impact areas, more significant ecological utility and social benefits, and greater uncertainty and interference faced by the implementation of the portfolio, and carry out robust optimization research on water environment comprehensive treatment portfolio of large rivers.

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